Timeline for Mitigation of Spectre and Meltdown affecting host OS from guest OS (Virtualbox)
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
6 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct 24, 2018 at 2:42 | comment | added | forest | I wouldn't even agree that it's usually quite challenging. But if you do not want to accept constructive criticism and suggestions, I cannot force them on you. Have a good day. | |
| Oct 22, 2018 at 15:34 | comment | added | DoubleD | I said it is "usually quite challenging" to exfiltrate data without the network, not that it is impossible. You are being deliberately pedantic, yet you still manage to ignore what I actually wrote. I am no longer engaging with you. Good day. | |
| Oct 20, 2018 at 3:02 | comment | added | forest | There are plenty of situations where data can be exfiltrated without a network connection. For example, one process with filesystem access could mount a side-channel attack against a target process and record its "findings" in the filesystem for later retrieval. Or a malicious process may use a side-channel attack to break ASLR in order to perform an exploit, without needing network access to do so. | |
| Oct 19, 2018 at 16:34 | comment | added | DoubleD | Neither have direct network implications. My point is that theft of data can only happen (typically) when networking is present. If he has non-networked Virtual Box guests, then guest mitigations are relatively pointless. Note the distinction between "exploit" and "threat", which are related but different concerns. | |
| Oct 19, 2018 at 3:59 | comment | added | forest | Spectre has nothing to do with networking. | |
| Oct 18, 2018 at 21:10 | history | answered | DoubleD | CC BY-SA 4.0 |