Skip to main content
17 events
when toggle format what by license comment
Jan 6, 2020 at 13:01 history bumped CommunityBot This question has answers that may be good or bad; the system has marked it active so that they can be reviewed.
May 7, 2019 at 8:01 history bumped CommunityBot This question has answers that may be good or bad; the system has marked it active so that they can be reviewed.
Apr 9, 2019 at 22:57 comment added forest @Xen2050 I can't think of any non-contrived scenario where that would be the case, otherwise literally everyone is screwed because even your old encrypted swap file in unallocated space could be a TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt volume. In reality, it's quite useful e.g. at border inspections. They can demand a password but they aren't going to beat it out of you under a bright light like in the movies.
Apr 9, 2019 at 21:48 comment added Xen2050 @forest True, in most situations & countries you're generally "innocent until proven guilty," and it's a slightly strange example, but the bottom line is if you can't prove you don't have hidden encrypted data, then you could be screwed
Apr 7, 2019 at 4:46 answer added forest timeline score: 1
Apr 7, 2019 at 4:45 comment added forest @Xen2050 It depends in your threat model. Also that write-up is kind of stupid.
Oct 21, 2018 at 10:45 comment added Xen2050 I read that Plausible Deniability is Theoretically Useless and you might regret not using it
Oct 20, 2018 at 11:38 comment added itwasthedog @Daisetsu Not really what I am looking for. I know about plausible deniabilty for encryption, but I'm more interested in how to plausible deny the second factor. Bakuriu, This is true but lets say you have a dog full of encrypted disks each having LUKS or Veracrypt header plus you have a part of the disk where your bootloader and kernel + initrd resides and the rest of the disk looks like encrypted data. So guess what could be in this part which looks like encrypted data. Yes, I know you can't prove that there is something in there or that it is encrypted at all, but it is quite improbable.
Oct 19, 2018 at 21:50 comment added Bakuriu No a Yubikey is not required. You don't have to do anything except saying "there is no encrypted volume" and "You are mistaken". That's the point of plausible deniability, the attacker cannot know whether encrypted data even exists.
Oct 19, 2018 at 21:46 comment added Daisetsu Veracryot has a page about the plausable deniability of hidden volumes. veracrypt.fr/en/Plausible%20Deniability.html that may be what you're looking for.
Oct 19, 2018 at 21:27 comment added itwasthedog Well, also true, I hope the second part about the dog makes it more clear on if/how the second factor is/has been used/required ;)
Oct 19, 2018 at 21:26 comment added schroeder "has been used" does not imply that it is required, just that someone tried
Oct 19, 2018 at 21:26 comment added schroeder @deviantfan i hear you, but I was really confused in the other wording. Suggestions?
Oct 19, 2018 at 21:19 comment added deviantfan (just my opinion, but "been used" was more clear ... when reading now, I was thinking "of course a second factor is not required to use LUKS etc., what do you want to prove there")
Oct 19, 2018 at 21:15 review First posts
Oct 19, 2018 at 21:59
Oct 19, 2018 at 21:12 history edited schroeder CC BY-SA 4.0
added 4 characters in body
Oct 19, 2018 at 21:10 history asked itwasthedog CC BY-SA 4.0