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pretty sure that was a typo...
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reirab
reirab
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You have identified only one risk, that of an attacker identifying machine roles on the network by using predictable host names.

I think you missed the competing risk, that of increased operator error by not using predictable and descriptive host names.

This is how I would assesassess those conflicting measures:

Use unpredictable host names

Benefit(s)

An attacker will need to spend (significant) more effort in determining the layout of your network and to identify the most profitable targets for a penetration attempt.

Risks

Operator error. Users and administrators may have difficulty identifying systems and their correct roles e.g. confusing test and production systems.

  • Probability: high
  • Impact: high

Rationale: Most humans have terrible memories where "random" data is concerned --> high probability.

Also there are usually very few barriers that prevent trusted users and administrators from making high impact mistakes --> high impact.

Use predictable host names

Benefit(s)

Reduced operator error rates, ease of management and automation.

Risks

Attackers will also have an easier time determining the layout of your network and to identify the most profitable targets for a penetration attempt.

  • Probability: medium
  • Impact: low

Rationale: Not every naming convention is immediately intuitive to a black-hat attacker --> medium probability.

Also using hostnames to predict a network layout is only a shortcut, but doesn't provide information that an attacker wouldn't be able to learn through other means. And knowledge of the role of a server as disclosed by a hostname does not automatically make it more vulnerable (only more or less valuable). --> low impact.

You have identified only one risk, that of an attacker identifying machine roles on the network by using predictable host names.

I think you missed the competing risk, that of increased operator error by not using predictable and descriptive host names.

This is how I would asses those conflicting measures:

Use unpredictable host names

Benefit(s)

An attacker will need to spend (significant) more effort in determining the layout of your network and to identify the most profitable targets for a penetration attempt.

Risks

Operator error. Users and administrators may have difficulty identifying systems and their correct roles e.g. confusing test and production systems.

  • Probability: high
  • Impact: high

Rationale: Most humans have terrible memories where "random" data is concerned --> high probability.

Also there are usually very few barriers that prevent trusted users and administrators from making high impact mistakes --> high impact.

Use predictable host names

Benefit(s)

Reduced operator error rates, ease of management and automation.

Risks

Attackers will also have an easier time determining the layout of your network and to identify the most profitable targets for a penetration attempt.

  • Probability: medium
  • Impact: low

Rationale: Not every naming convention is immediately intuitive to a black-hat attacker --> medium probability.

Also using hostnames to predict a network layout is only a shortcut, but doesn't provide information that an attacker wouldn't be able to learn through other means. And knowledge of the role of a server as disclosed by a hostname does not automatically make it more vulnerable (only more or less valuable). --> low impact.

You have identified only one risk, that of an attacker identifying machine roles on the network by using predictable host names.

I think you missed the competing risk, that of increased operator error by not using predictable and descriptive host names.

This is how I would assess those conflicting measures:

Use unpredictable host names

Benefit(s)

An attacker will need to spend (significant) more effort in determining the layout of your network and to identify the most profitable targets for a penetration attempt.

Risks

Operator error. Users and administrators may have difficulty identifying systems and their correct roles e.g. confusing test and production systems.

  • Probability: high
  • Impact: high

Rationale: Most humans have terrible memories where "random" data is concerned --> high probability.

Also there are usually very few barriers that prevent trusted users and administrators from making high impact mistakes --> high impact.

Use predictable host names

Benefit(s)

Reduced operator error rates, ease of management and automation.

Risks

Attackers will also have an easier time determining the layout of your network and to identify the most profitable targets for a penetration attempt.

  • Probability: medium
  • Impact: low

Rationale: Not every naming convention is immediately intuitive to a black-hat attacker --> medium probability.

Also using hostnames to predict a network layout is only a shortcut, but doesn't provide information that an attacker wouldn't be able to learn through other means. And knowledge of the role of a server as disclosed by a hostname does not automatically make it more vulnerable (only more or less valuable). --> low impact.

added 16 characters in body
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HBruijn
HBruijn
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You have identified only one risk, that of an attacker identifying machine roles on the network by using predictable host names.

I think you missed the competing risk, that of increased operator error by not using predictable and descriptive host names.

This is how I would asses those conflicting measures:

Use unpredictable host names

Benefit(s)

An attacker will need to spend (significant) more effort in determining the layout of your network and to identify the most profitable targets for a penetration attempt.

Risks

Operator error. Users and administrators may have difficulty identifying systems and their correct roles e.g. confusing test and production systems.

  • Probability: high
  • Impact: high

Rationale: Most humans have terrible memories where "random" data is concerned --> high probability.

Also there are usually very few barriers that prevent trusted users and administrators from making high impact mistakes --> high impact.

Use predictable host names

Benefit(s)

Reduced operator error rates, ease of management and automation.

Risks

Attackers will also have an easier time determining the layout of your network and to identify the most profitable targets for a penetration attempt.

  • Probability: medium
  • Impact: low

Rationale: Not every naming convention is immediately intuitive to a black-hat attacker --> medium probability.

Also using hostnames to predict a network layout is only a shortcut, but doesn't provide information that an attacker wouldn't be able to learn through other means. And knowledge of the role of a server as disclosed by a hostname does not automatically make it more vulnerable (only more or less valuable). --> low impact.

You have identified only one risk, that of an attacker identifying machine roles on the network by using predictable host names.

I think you missed the competing risk, that of increased operator error by not using predictable host names.

This is how I would asses those conflicting measures:

Use unpredictable host names

Benefit(s)

An attacker will need to spend (significant) more effort in determining the layout of your network and to identify the most profitable targets for a penetration attempt.

Risks

Operator error. Users and administrators may have difficulty identifying systems and their correct roles e.g. confusing test and production systems.

  • Probability: high
  • Impact: high

Rationale: Most humans have terrible memories where "random" data is concerned --> high probability.

Also there are usually very few barriers that prevent trusted users and administrators from making high impact mistakes --> high impact.

Use predictable host names

Benefit(s)

Reduced operator error rates, ease of management and automation.

Risks

Attackers will also have an easier time determining the layout of your network and to identify the most profitable targets for a penetration attempt.

  • Probability: medium
  • Impact: low

Rationale: Not every naming convention is immediately intuitive to a black-hat attacker --> medium probability.

Also using hostnames to predict a network layout is only a shortcut, but doesn't provide information that an attacker wouldn't be able to learn through other means. And knowledge of the role of a server as disclosed by a hostname does not automatically make it more vulnerable (only more or less valuable). --> low impact.

You have identified only one risk, that of an attacker identifying machine roles on the network by using predictable host names.

I think you missed the competing risk, that of increased operator error by not using predictable and descriptive host names.

This is how I would asses those conflicting measures:

Use unpredictable host names

Benefit(s)

An attacker will need to spend (significant) more effort in determining the layout of your network and to identify the most profitable targets for a penetration attempt.

Risks

Operator error. Users and administrators may have difficulty identifying systems and their correct roles e.g. confusing test and production systems.

  • Probability: high
  • Impact: high

Rationale: Most humans have terrible memories where "random" data is concerned --> high probability.

Also there are usually very few barriers that prevent trusted users and administrators from making high impact mistakes --> high impact.

Use predictable host names

Benefit(s)

Reduced operator error rates, ease of management and automation.

Risks

Attackers will also have an easier time determining the layout of your network and to identify the most profitable targets for a penetration attempt.

  • Probability: medium
  • Impact: low

Rationale: Not every naming convention is immediately intuitive to a black-hat attacker --> medium probability.

Also using hostnames to predict a network layout is only a shortcut, but doesn't provide information that an attacker wouldn't be able to learn through other means. And knowledge of the role of a server as disclosed by a hostname does not automatically make it more vulnerable (only more or less valuable). --> low impact.

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HBruijn
HBruijn
  • 1.3k
  • 10
  • 13

You have identified only one risk, that of an attacker identifying machine roles on the network by using predictable host names.

I think you missed the competing risk, that of increased operator error by not using predictable host names.

This is how I would asses those conflicting measures:

Use unpredictable host names

Benefit(s)

An attacker will need to spend (significant) more effort in determining the layout of your network and to identify the most profitable targets for a penetration attempt.

Risks

Operator error. Users and administrators may have difficulty identifying systems and their correct roles e.g. confusing test and production systems.

  • Probability: high
  • Impact: high

Rationale: Most humans have terrible memories where "random" data is concerned --> high probability.

Also there are usually very few barriers that prevent trusted users and administrators from making high impact mistakes --> high impact.

Use predictable host names

Benefit(s)

Reduced operator error rates, ease of management and automation.

Risks

Attackers will also have an easier time determining the layout of your network and to identify the most profitable targets for a penetration attempt.

  • Probability: medium
  • Impact: low

Rationale: Not every naming convention is immediately intuitive to a black-hat attacker --> medium probability.

Also using hostnames to predict a network layout is only a shortcut, but doesn't provide information that an attacker wouldn't be able to learn through other means. And knowledge of the role of a server as disclosed by a hostname does not automatically make it more vulnerable (only more or less valuable). --> low impact.