Timeline for Password hashing that is resistant to ASIC-assisted cracking without risking DoS of server
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
26 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
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| S Jan 30, 2020 at 21:01 | history | bounty ended | Conor Mancone | ||
| S Jan 30, 2020 at 21:01 | history | notice removed | Conor Mancone | ||
| S Jan 29, 2020 at 8:29 | history | edited | Luc |
remove ddos tag because DDoS is not what is being described here: this describes DoS (not necessarily distributed)
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| S Jan 29, 2020 at 8:29 | history | suggested | Soteri |
for better finding
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| Jan 29, 2020 at 8:20 | review | Suggested edits | |||
| S Jan 29, 2020 at 8:29 | |||||
| Jan 29, 2020 at 7:15 | history | edited | Ole Tange | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
added 15 characters in body
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| S Jan 29, 2020 at 1:10 | history | bounty started | Conor Mancone | ||
| S Jan 29, 2020 at 1:10 | history | notice added | Conor Mancone | Reward existing answer | |
| Jan 28, 2020 at 23:41 | answer | added | Luis Casillas | timeline score: 3 | |
| Jan 28, 2020 at 21:20 | comment | added | Royce Williams | @FutureSecurity The source is the author of the tweet - Jeremi Gosney, one of the Password Hashing Competition judges - and related tweets from Steve 'sc00bzT' Thomas, one of the other PHC judges, useful thread at twitter.com/Sc00bzT/status/1149950559258140673 . Holding hardware equal, tuning the reference implementation of Argon2i to be under .5s results in less bruteforce resistance than bcrypt. bcrypt still truncates at 72, though. | |
| Jan 28, 2020 at 18:56 | comment | added | Steve Sether | I'm not sure exactly what the algorithms focus on, but it seems like Monero has gone through a few iterations. cryptoslate.com/is-asic-resistant-cryptocurrency-even-possible Ethereum is trying the same. finance.yahoo.com/news/… I know very little about it, but I am slightly familiar with using large amounts of memory to foil ASICs. You'd have to go and look at what they've done to find any difficulties they've encountered. | |
| Jan 28, 2020 at 17:59 | comment | added | Ole Tange | @SteveSether Sorry. What I meant was: Can you provide a link to that? I have a feeling they were focussing on memory hard problems with very small memory requirements (in the order of 1 MB), and thus their failure would not necessarily apply here. But a link that describes the situations for these crypto-currencies could make it clear if that was also relevant here. | |
| Jan 28, 2020 at 17:05 | comment | added | Future Security | @RoyceWilliams Do you have a source that elaborates on that? I've got questions and skepticism. What does that mean? What version of Argon2(i)? What memory cost parameters? What hardware was considered? Why is that the case? Where exactly does the cutoff lie today? How much worse is one option vs the other at specific parameterizations? | |
| Jan 28, 2020 at 16:24 | comment | added | Steve Sether | @OleTange Calm down? If you know of a solution that works, great. But can you stop with the hard nosed "please provide evidence" to something that's just a comment, and casual observation? | |
| Jan 28, 2020 at 16:18 | history | edited | Ole Tange | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
added 233 characters in body; edited title
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| Jan 28, 2020 at 16:09 | comment | added | Ole Tange | @SteveSether Please provide evidence for ASICs that did memory hard problems without having the memory in the 1 GB scale (Scale really matters here). | |
| Jan 28, 2020 at 15:57 | comment | added | Steve Sether | Crypto-currencies have tried similar approaches attempting to become ASIC resistant. IIUC it hasn't been terribly successful as the ASICs are eventually developed for the new algorithm. | |
| Jan 28, 2020 at 13:10 | comment | added | schroeder♦ | Your scenario appears to be focused on the password hashes and not all the other controls that you say are to be ignored for sake of argument, so I have focused the question on the hashes. | |
| Jan 28, 2020 at 13:09 | history | edited | schroeder♦ | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
deleted 371 characters in body; edited title; edited tags
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| Jan 24, 2020 at 15:21 | vote | accept | Ole Tange | ||
| Jan 23, 2020 at 1:20 | answer | added | Cort Ammon | timeline score: 10 | |
| Jan 23, 2020 at 0:32 | history | edited | Ole Tange | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
added 222 characters in body
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| Jan 22, 2020 at 18:48 | comment | added | Royce Williams | Semi-unrelated, but addressing your larger approach: be aware that at speeds tolerable to human interaction (UX studies suggest .5s or lower), bcrypt is actually more resistant to offline cracking than Argon2i when they are both tuned to be under that .5s threshold. twitter.com/jmgosney/status/1111865772656246786 | |
| Jan 22, 2020 at 15:47 | answer | added | ThoriumBR | timeline score: 7 | |
| S Jan 22, 2020 at 14:12 | answer | added | Ole Tange | timeline score: -7 | |
| S Jan 22, 2020 at 14:12 | history | asked | Ole Tange | CC BY-SA 4.0 |