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Nov 10, 2020 at 1:31 comment added brynk @1-or-1 you could validate a signature with only a public key, ie. your valid python process can produce the pickle, and in the future, you can validate the integrity before you trust it .. but can you do this for all .so or .pyc? as you already know, nothing will stop an adjacent process in the current context from potentially accessing memory, the risk here being that another process intercepts the secret signing key, and generates a trustworthy sig for a malicious xyz file (look at hidepid=2 viz. linux-dev.org/2012/09/hide-process-information-for-other-users)
Nov 9, 2020 at 3:04 history edited 1' OR 1 -- CC BY-SA 4.0
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Nov 9, 2020 at 2:34 comment added 1' OR 1 -- I don't see how signing/authenticating could help as it would need to happen after the privilege drop and the keys would need to be accessible there. And to clarify, I don't assume the unprivileged Python process to be vulnerable or malicious itself. I just fear that another vulnerable process could be running as "nobody", which could in turn have the permissions to tamper with the memory of the unprivileged Python process after the privilege drop.
Nov 9, 2020 at 2:17 history edited 1' OR 1 -- CC BY-SA 4.0
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Nov 9, 2020 at 2:01 answer added Alexis Wilke timeline score: 1
Nov 9, 2020 at 1:57 comment added brynk you can't completely isolate a python process launched by yourself, within the same context as a malicious one, on the 'average' linux kernel, any more than you can punch yourself in the face and win... (eg. try strace next time you start python and see how much gets pulled in...) Q: do you have the luxury of signing or encrypting (aead) the pickled data?
Nov 9, 2020 at 1:42 review First posts
Nov 9, 2020 at 8:58
Nov 9, 2020 at 1:36 history asked 1' OR 1 -- CC BY-SA 4.0