Timeline for Can a secure MitM-free channel be established between two peer "strangers" in the presence of an active adversary?
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
5 events
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Dec 13, 2021 at 7:18 | comment | added | cnd | I was hoping for some kind of mathematical solution, perhaps based on verifiable delays ( eprint.iacr.org/2018/623.pdf ) - where some aspect of the key that Alice gets from Bob contains some indication of the processing power available to Bob, which Mallory is unable to counterfeit in real time without detection ... (especially if she's got to counterfeit both sides at once) | |
Dec 13, 2021 at 7:08 | comment | added | cnd | The problem itself is described thus: Alice connects to Bob, gives Bob her public key, and asks Bob for his public key key. The MitM attacker, Mallory, pretends to be Bob, so Alice gets Mallory's key (thinking it's Bobs) and Bob gets Mallory's key too (thinking it's Alice's). Mallory sits in the middle, decrypting and reading/changing traffic at will, before re-encrypting it (to the real public key of the intended recipient) and sending it on its way. | |
Dec 12, 2021 at 8:01 | answer | added | Steffen Ullrich | timeline score: 2 | |
S Dec 12, 2021 at 6:33 | review | First questions | |||
Dec 12, 2021 at 7:20 | |||||
S Dec 12, 2021 at 6:33 | history | asked | cnd | CC BY-SA 4.0 |