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not2savvy
not2savvy
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Trying to understand OCSP stapling and OCSP must-staple, I've read multiple explanations, but I still don't understand what makes OCSP must-staple secure.

My understanding is that, during TLS, the clients request the server certificate from the (web) server, and the server will send the certificate including the OCSP response for that certificate, and we call that stapling. The OCSP response has been retrieved by server from the OCSP responder whose URL is in the Certificate Authority Information Access extension of the certificate. The response is signed by the CA.

Provided that this is correct, I do not understand why the OCSP response cannot be faked?

If a MITM attacker would be able to exchange the certificate, wouldn't they be able to exchange the OCSP response, too? As explained in various places, the OCSP response is secure because it signed by the CA. But if the attacker was able to create a fake certificate signed by the CA (or a CA), why wouldn't they be able to do the same with a fkefake OCSP response? What am I missing here?

Trying to understand OCSP stapling and OCSP must-staple, I've read multiple explanations, but I still don't understand what makes OCSP must-staple secure.

My understanding is that, during TLS, the clients request the server certificate from the (web) server, and the server will send the certificate including the OCSP response for that certificate, and we call that stapling. The OCSP response has been retrieved by server from the OCSP responder whose URL is in the Certificate Authority Information Access extension of the certificate. The response is signed by the CA.

Provided that this is correct, I do not understand why the OCSP response cannot be faked?

If a MITM attacker would be able to exchange the certificate, wouldn't they be able to exchange the OCSP response, too? As explained in various places, the OCSP response is secure because it signed by the CA. But if the attacker was able to create a fake certificate signed by the CA (or a CA), why wouldn't they be able to the same with a fke OCSP response? What am I missing here?

Trying to understand OCSP stapling and OCSP must-staple, I've read multiple explanations, but I still don't understand what makes OCSP must-staple secure.

My understanding is that, during TLS, the clients request the server certificate from the (web) server, and the server will send the certificate including the OCSP response for that certificate, and we call that stapling. The OCSP response has been retrieved by server from the OCSP responder whose URL is in the Certificate Authority Information Access extension of the certificate. The response is signed by the CA.

Provided that this is correct, I do not understand why the OCSP response cannot be faked?

If a MITM attacker would be able to exchange the certificate, wouldn't they be able to exchange the OCSP response, too? As explained in various places, the OCSP response is secure because it signed by the CA. But if the attacker was able to create a fake certificate signed by the CA (or a CA), why wouldn't they be able to do the same with a fake OCSP response? What am I missing here?

Source Link
not2savvy
not2savvy
  • 764
  • 5
  • 12

Why is OCSP must-staple secure?

Trying to understand OCSP stapling and OCSP must-staple, I've read multiple explanations, but I still don't understand what makes OCSP must-staple secure.

My understanding is that, during TLS, the clients request the server certificate from the (web) server, and the server will send the certificate including the OCSP response for that certificate, and we call that stapling. The OCSP response has been retrieved by server from the OCSP responder whose URL is in the Certificate Authority Information Access extension of the certificate. The response is signed by the CA.

Provided that this is correct, I do not understand why the OCSP response cannot be faked?

If a MITM attacker would be able to exchange the certificate, wouldn't they be able to exchange the OCSP response, too? As explained in various places, the OCSP response is secure because it signed by the CA. But if the attacker was able to create a fake certificate signed by the CA (or a CA), why wouldn't they be able to the same with a fke OCSP response? What am I missing here?