Return to Answer

You are right, the problem with e-voting is validation, not encryption. One can change values on the fly prior to encryption. What is important is the ability to check the votes after the fact.

Scantegrity has this all worked out, they use a one-time-pad to assign a code to each candidate that is unique to each ballot.

The codes and ballot numbers are published publicly. Only some tiny percentage of votes need to be checked to get very high statistical reliability of the election results. If there are discrepancies, the physical ballots can be hand-counted again.

The online voting version mails physical ballots similar to the above type. On the website, the user enters in the code that correspondents to the ballot and candidate. As each ballot/candidate voting choice is unique, the malware cannot simply change the vote because it does not know the code that corresponds to the preferred candidate.

As with Scantegrity, the ballots and candidate numbers (but not the candidate names they correspond to) are posted publicly. The mail-return acts as a futher verification and (in the case of technical problems) a remediation step.

You are right, the problem with e-voting is validation, not encryption. One can change values on the fly prior to encryption. What is important is the ability to check the votes after the fact.

Scantegrity has this all worked out, they use a one-time-pad to assign a code to each candidate that is unique to each ballot.

The codes and ballot numbers are published publicly. Only some tiny percentage of votes need to be checked to get very high statistical reliability of the election results. If there are discrepancies, the physical ballots can be hand-counted again.

The online voting version mails physical ballots similar to the above type. On the website, the user enters in the code that correspondents to the ballot and candidate. As each ballot/candidate voting choice is unique, the malware cannot simply change the vote because it does not know the code that corresponds to the preferred candidate.

As with Scantegrity, the ballots and candidate numbers (but not the candidate names they correspond to) are posted publicly. The mail-return acts as a futher verification and (in the case of technical problems) a remediation step.

You are right, the problem with e-voting is validation, not encryption. One can change values on the fly prior to encryption. What is important is the ability to check the votes after the fact.

Scantegrity has this all worked out, they even have a vote-by-computer system that uses mail-in ballots as a verification step. Using a one-time-pad, each yes/no choice is encrypted.

You are right, the problem with e-voting is validation, not encryption. One can change values on the fly prior to encryption. What is important is the ability to check the votes after the fact.

Scantegrity has this all worked out, they use a one-time-pad to assign a code to each candidate that is unique to each ballot.

The codes and ballot numbers are published publicly. Only some tiny percentage of votes need to be checked to get very high statistical reliability of the election results. If there are discrepancies, the physical ballots can be hand-counted again.

The online voting version mails physical ballots similar to the above type. On the website, the user enters in the code that correspondents to the ballot and candidate. As each ballot/candidate voting choice is unique, the malware cannot simply change the vote because it does not know the code that corresponds to the preferred candidate.

As with Scantegrity, the ballots and candidate numbers (but not the candidate names they correspond to) are posted publicly. The mail-return acts as a futher verification and (in the case of technical problems) a remediation step.

You are right, the problem with e-voting is validation, not encryption. One can change values on the fly prior to encryption. What is important is the ability to check the votes after the fact.

Scantegrity has this all worked out, they even have a vote-by-computer system that uses mail-in ballots as a verification step. Using a one-time-pad, each yes/no choice is encrypted using a one-time pad setup.

You are right, the problem with e-voting is validation, not encryption. One can change values on the fly prior to encryption. What is important is the ability to check the votes after the fact.

Scantegrity has this all worked out, they even have a vote-by-computer system that uses mail-in ballots as a verification step. Using a one-time-pad, each yes/no choice is encrypted.