Timeline for Best practices for Tor use, in light of released NSA slides
Current License: CC BY-SA 3.0
16 events
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| Mar 17, 2017 at 13:14 | history | edited | CommunityBot |
replaced http://security.stackexchange.com/ with https://security.stackexchange.com/
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| May 1, 2016 at 13:52 | comment | added | Mok-Kong Shen | If you can rule out the case that your adversary is mighty enough and willing to tap on the line from your location to your ISP or your ISP's being somehow coerced to cooperate with your adversary, then I believe that Tor would indeed work quite fine. Otherwise, since your emails initially carry your IP-address, your identity would be clearly revealed through the said kind of tapping and a way-out would be to attempt to use a foreign IP-address, e.g. one of a call-shop, to send your emails, if you could exclude your being under surveillance while doing so. | |
| Feb 1, 2014 at 16:14 | comment | added | Ian Ringrose | Don't use Tor unless you want the NSA to think you need checking up on! | |
| S Jan 10, 2014 at 16:36 | history | suggested | samthebrand | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
Great question will be featured at Lifehacker today. A couple quick edits for flow, and to offer context on date.
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| Jan 10, 2014 at 16:30 | review | Suggested edits | |||
| S Jan 10, 2014 at 16:36 | |||||
| Dec 14, 2013 at 1:24 | comment | added | mirimir | As I read this, malware and exploits are the tools of choice against Tor users. Traffic analysis has reportedly not been very successful. But of course, the presentations may be intentionally misleading. | |
| Oct 18, 2013 at 2:37 | comment | added | nitrl | Addendum: Schneier analysis of exploits- schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/10/how_the_nsa_att.html | |
| Oct 9, 2013 at 14:46 | vote | accept | nitrl | ||
| Oct 8, 2013 at 19:23 | vote | accept | nitrl | ||
| Oct 8, 2013 at 19:24 | |||||
| Oct 7, 2013 at 20:50 | answer | added | Michael Hampton | timeline score: 110 | |
| Oct 7, 2013 at 18:25 | comment | added | Michael Hampton | All of the Tor Project's existing recommendations still apply, as far as I know. The problem is that most Tor users miss at least one of them. I have my own list, which I'll post later. | |
| Oct 5, 2013 at 15:51 | answer | added | scuzzy-delta | timeline score: 20 | |
| Oct 5, 2013 at 8:06 | comment | added | LateralFractal | I thought about answering this, but there are too many variables. Some security enhancements require cunning use of VMs and NATs to hide a computer's IP from itself if the Tor Browser leaks; some other enhancements require an overhaul of the Tor protocol to resist traffic analysis. Common sense information hygiene and compartmentalisation is about the only generic advice I could give you. That and don't be a criminal. | |
| Oct 5, 2013 at 3:33 | comment | added | Fiasco Labs | Use only for political activism... Would be a best practice to lower your threat surface. Don't follow the Silk Road to cause reason for criminal investigation. | |
| Oct 5, 2013 at 3:17 | history | tweeted | twitter.com/#!/StackSecurity/status/386329230487076864 | ||
| Oct 5, 2013 at 1:53 | history | asked | nitrl | CC BY-SA 3.0 |