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Richard's right, I misread the paper.
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sarnold
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Song, Wagner, and Tian have shown that it The referenced paper is possible to speed up brute-force password searches roughly 50 times by using timing information from ssh sessions. Noack revisited their studydiscussing passwords typed within an ssh session; I think it, and found SSH2 vulnerable to timing analysis as well.

The attack makes two assumptions:

  • The password hash is available for brute-force cracking.
  • An attacker can get accurate timestamps on packets sent between hosts, or otherwise acquiring timing information.

Public keysRichard's comments, are not only more convenientworth keeping around, but more secure against certain threatsno longer believe in the answer itself. (I still do prefer public keys.)

Song, Wagner, and Tian have shown that it is possible to speed up brute-force password searches roughly 50 times by using timing information from ssh sessions. Noack revisited their study and found SSH2 vulnerable to timing analysis as well.

The attack makes two assumptions:

  • The password hash is available for brute-force cracking.
  • An attacker can get accurate timestamps on packets sent between hosts, or otherwise acquiring timing information.

Public keys are not only more convenient, but more secure against certain threats.

Song, Wagner, and Tian have shown that it is possible to speed up brute-force password searches roughly 50 times by using timing information from ssh sessions. Noack revisited their study and found SSH2 vulnerable to timing analysis as well.

The attack makes two assumptions:

  • The password hash is available for brute-force cracking.
  • An attacker can get accurate timestamps on packets sent between hosts, or otherwise acquiring timing information.

Public keys are not only more convenient, but more secure against certain threats.

The referenced paper is discussing passwords typed within an ssh session; I think it, and Richard's comments, are worth keeping around, but no longer believe in the answer itself. (I still do prefer public keys.)

Song, Wagner, and Tian have shown that it is possible to speed up brute-force password searches roughly 50 times by using timing information from ssh sessions. Noack revisited their study and found SSH2 vulnerable to timing analysis as well.

The attack makes two assumptions:

  • The password hash is available for brute-force cracking.
  • An attacker can get accurate timestamps on packets sent between hosts, or otherwise acquiring timing information.

Public keys are not only more convenient, but more secure against certain threats.

Source Link
sarnold
  • 741
  • 4
  • 7

Song, Wagner, and Tian have shown that it is possible to speed up brute-force password searches roughly 50 times by using timing information from ssh sessions. Noack revisited their study and found SSH2 vulnerable to timing analysis as well.

The attack makes two assumptions:

  • The password hash is available for brute-force cracking.
  • An attacker can get accurate timestamps on packets sent between hosts, or otherwise acquiring timing information.

Public keys are not only more convenient, but more secure against certain threats.