Timeline for For remotely unlocking LUKS volumes via SSH, how can I verify integrity before sending passphrase?
Current License: CC BY-SA 3.0
12 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
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| Apr 3, 2020 at 1:48 | comment | added | inf3rno | @tylerl I am not sure I understand. What happens when the TPM fails? Do I lose all the data if I do full disk encryption with it? | |
| Nov 29, 2017 at 9:44 | comment | added | forest | Not only that, but the CRTM ensures that the root of trust ends with something which cannot be tampered with. | |
| Nov 29, 2017 at 9:36 | comment | added | forest | The TPM is specifically designed to mitigate that risk. It is similar to a signed cert from a CA. You would have to argue that the hosting company has stolen this key in order to worry about a fake TPM. There is a reason it is impossible to run a TPM like this in software. This key is called the Endorsement Key. It is designed to ensure that a genuine TPM can be recognized. | |
| Nov 29, 2017 at 9:25 | comment | added | tylerl | @Baal-zebub Remote attestation is only meaningful if you can trust the TPM. If you have never been in physical possession of the server, then you don't know for certain that the hosting company doesn't have the private key (e.g the TPM may be implemented in software). Protecting against the hosting company is fundamentally impossible because they control the initial conditions. | |
| Nov 29, 2017 at 8:16 | comment | added | forest | "You don't. You can't." This is fundamentally incorrect. Remote attestation is possible when using a TPM. | |
| Dec 13, 2013 at 8:48 | vote | accept | mirimir | ||
| Dec 6, 2013 at 6:09 | comment | added | mirimir | Thank you. I do appreciate that there is nothing that I can do to prevent hosting providers, or adversaries who have gained access, from doing as they will to my hardware. All that I seek are ways to detect changes before providing my passphrase. I'm not even expecting to know whether changes have enabled passphrase logging. I'll do my best to choose a trustworthy hosting provider. But circumstances may change, and I want another layer of protection, even though it may be imperfect. | |
| Dec 6, 2013 at 5:37 | comment | added | tylerl | TPM is tied to hardware. Its keys are available to no one. Were it not so, then the TPM would not be tied to hardware. Your hosting provider must be trusted, by definition. He has physical control over your device, which mean there is nothing but nothing you can do to stop him. Best bet is physical intrusion detection hardware, etc. But even that can be circumvented. FDE isn't pointless, but don't fool yourself into thinking that it will create a trusted environment out of an untrusted one. | |
| Dec 6, 2013 at 5:00 | comment | added | mirimir | Perhaps "user" was poor wording. I'm talking about owners, or at least renters. If I need to trust some third party in using the TPM, that's no better than simply trusting the hosting provider. In any case, are you arguing that FDE is always pointless for hosted servers? | |
| Dec 6, 2013 at 4:17 | comment | added | tylerl | The whole point of TPMs is that users can't copy or overwrite the private key. Perhaps you have a different idea of what reliable should mean. As for your tests, sure, anything will detect some attacks. But security doesn't come from the ability to detect some attacks. | |
| Dec 6, 2013 at 4:03 | comment | added | mirimir | TPM isn't reliable, because users can't rewrite (or even see) private keys, or validate chain of trust. And building my own TPM isn't feasible. Wouldn't tests that I mentioned detect at least some attacks? Is trust in the hosting provider the only relevant factor? | |
| Dec 6, 2013 at 2:17 | history | answered | tylerl | CC BY-SA 3.0 |