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The key is onavailable from the device, so an unlocked device (or guessable/brute-forceable) will elicit the key. The key is also on any synced iTunes apps. By sending remote kill (if possible, which should never be relied upon since RF blocking handkerchiefs/bags are well known tools used by adversaries), this can delete the key, disabling recovery of the key and filesystem, and providing "fast wipe" functionality.

It is otherwise extremely awesome, given these very realistic limitations (i.e. no TPM). BlackBerry can't do this sort of thing without a BES (although BES Express is available for free if you have Exchange or SBS/etc server). Android relies on third-party, which is unreliable and insecure at best.

There are two books that cover this, Enterprise Mac Administrator's Guide and the iPhone Forensics book. The former mentions http://www.cellebrite.com for Security ID recovery.

The key is on the device, so an unlocked device (or guessable/brute-forceable) will elicit the key. The key is also on any synced iTunes apps. By sending remote kill (if possible, which should never be relied upon since RF blocking handkerchiefs/bags are well known tools used by adversaries), this can delete the key, disabling recovery of the key and filesystem, and providing "fast wipe" functionality.

It is otherwise extremely awesome, given these very realistic limitations (i.e. no TPM). BlackBerry can't do this sort of thing without a BES (although BES Express is available for free if you have Exchange or SBS/etc server). Android relies on third-party, which is unreliable and insecure at best.

There are two books that cover this, Enterprise Mac Administrator's Guide and the iPhone Forensics book. The former mentions http://www.cellebrite.com for Security ID recovery.

The key is available from the device, so an unlocked device (or guessable/brute-forceable) will elicit the key. The key is also on any synced iTunes apps. By sending remote kill (if possible, which should never be relied upon since RF blocking handkerchiefs/bags are well known tools used by adversaries), this can delete the key, disabling recovery of the key and filesystem, and providing "fast wipe" functionality.

It is otherwise extremely awesome, given these very realistic limitations (i.e. no TPM). BlackBerry can't do this sort of thing without a BES (although BES Express is available for free if you have Exchange or SBS/etc server). Android relies on third-party, which is unreliable and insecure at best.

There are two books that cover this, Enterprise Mac Administrator's Guide and the iPhone Forensics book. The former mentions http://www.cellebrite.com for Security ID recovery.

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source | link

The key is on the device, so an unlocked device (or guessable/brute-forceable) will elicit the key. The key is also on any synced iTunes apps. By sending remote kill (if possible, which should never be relied upon since RF blocking handkerchiefs/bags are well known tools used by adversaries), this can delete the key, disabling recovery of the key and filesystem, and providing "fast wipe" functionality.

It is otherwise extremely awesome, given these very realistic limitations (i.e. no TPM). BlackBerry can't do this sort of thing without a BES (although BES Express is available for free if you have Exchange or SBS/etc server). Android relies on third-party, which is unreliable and insecure at best.

There are two books that cover this, Enterprise Mac Administrator's Guide and the iPhone Forensics book. The former mentions http://www.cellebrite.com for Security ID recovery.