In most cases another user cannot read your environment variables. However, the well known security hole that an instance of a setuid program runs as the same user as any other instance of a setuid program can be exploited. This means that if someone runs a setuid program and someone else can exploit another program that is setuid to the same user to read from /proc/<pid>/environ then they can read the program's environment variables. This is one reason why you should use a new user instead of abusing the nobody user.

In most cases another user cannot read your environment variables. However, the well known security hole that an instance of a setuid program runs as the same user as any other instance of a setuid program can be exploited. This means that if someone runs a setuid program and someone else can exploit another program that is setuid to the same user to read from /proc/<pid>/environ then they can read the program's environment variables. This is one reason why you should use a new user for any daemon you write instead of abusing the nobody user.

In most cases another user cannot read your environment variables. However, the well known security hole that an instance of a setuid program runs as the same user as any other instance of a setuid program can be exploited. This means that if someone runs a setuid program and someone else can exploit another program that is setuid to the same user to read from /proc/<pid>/environ then they can read the program's environment variables.

In most cases another user cannot read your environment variables. However, the well known security hole that an instance of a setuid program runs as the same user as any other instance of a setuid program can be exploited. This means that if someone runs a setuid program and someone else can exploit another program that is setuid to the same user to read from /proc/<pid>/environ then they can read the program's environment variables. This is one reason why you should use a new user instead of abusing the nobody user.