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You cannot answer this question without answering the following question

If a user's password is compromised, does that only put that user/that user's data at risk, or does it also put other users at risk?

If the system does not compartmentalize accounts, then a user cannot keep their data safe by choosing appropriate credentials, so administrators must be responsible, in part, for the overall security of the community.

If the system does compartmentalize accounts, then a user can only harm themselves by choosing weak credentials, so shifting responsibility to the user can be a reasonable.

For example, email mailboxes are well compartmentalized; compromising one account does not compromise others much. Some accounts might be set up to not treat as spam mail from other accounts, but there are many other ways to impersonate email senders so the ability to send email as a user is not often a huge escalation of authority. An administrator can abdicate responsibility for password strength without compromising the security of the system.

But file systems and source code repositories are not well compartmentalized. Compromising one account whose ~/bin directory is on other users' PATHs, or which has commit access to a vital source code repository can lead to the compromise of many other accounts and systems via trojans. In this case, compromising one account escalates authority system-wide; administrators cannot abdicate responsibility for password strength because they cannot abdicate responsibility for system health.

You cannot answer this question without answering the following question

If a user's password is compromised, does that only put that user/that user's data at risk, or does it also put other users at risk?

If the system does not compartmentalize accounts, then a user cannot keep their data safe by choosing appropriate credentials, so administrators must be responsible, in part, for the overall security of the community.

If the system does compartmentalize accounts, then a user can only harm themselves by choosing weak credentials, so shifting responsibility to the user can be appropriate.

For example, email mailboxes are well compartmentalized; compromising one account does not compromise others much. Some accounts might be set up to not treat as spam mail from other accounts, but there are many other ways to impersonate email senders so the ability to send email as a user is not often a huge escalation of authority. An administrator can abdicate responsibility for password strength without compromising the security of the system.

But file systems and source code repositories are not well compartmentalized. Compromising one account whose ~/bin directory is on other users' PATHs, or which has commit access to a vital source code repository can lead to the compromise of many other accounts and systems via trojans. In this case, compromising one account escalates authority system-wide; administrators cannot abdicate responsibility for password strength because they cannot abdicate responsibility for system health.

You cannot answer this question without answering the following question

If a user's password is compromised, does that only put that user/that user's data at risk, or does it also put other users at risk?

If the system does not compartmentalize accounts, then a user cannot keep their data safe by choosing appropriate credentials, so administrators must be responsible, in part, for the overall security of the community.

If the system does compartmentalize accounts, then a user can only harm themselves by choosing weak credentials, so shifting responsibility to the user can be a reasonable.

For example, email systems are well compartmentalized; compromising one account does not compromise others much. Some accounts might be set up to not treat as spam mail from other accounts, but there are many other ways to impersonate email so the ability to send email as a user is not often a huge escalation of authority. An administrator can abdicate responsibility for password strength without compromising the security of the system.

But file systems and source code repositories are not well compartmentalized. Compromising one account whose ~/bin directory is on other users' PATHs, or which has commit access to a vital source code repository can lead to the compromise of many other accounts and systems via trojans. In this case, compromising one account escalates authority system-wide; administrators cannot abdicate responsibility for password strength because they cannot abdicate responsibility for system health.

You cannot answer this question without answering the following question

If a user's password is compromised, does that only put that user/that user's data at risk, or does it also put other users at risk?

If the system does not compartmentalize accounts, then a user cannot keep their data safe by choosing appropriate credentials, so administrators must be responsible, in part, for the overall security of the community.

If the system does compartmentalize accounts, then a user can only harm themselves by choosing weak credentials, so shifting responsibility to the user can be a reasonable.

For example, email mailboxes are well compartmentalized; compromising one account does not compromise others much. Some accounts might be set up to not treat as spam mail from other accounts, but there are many other ways to impersonate email senders so the ability to send email as a user is not often a huge escalation of authority. An administrator can abdicate responsibility for password strength without compromising the security of the system.

But file systems and source code repositories are not well compartmentalized. Compromising one account whose ~/bin directory is on other users' PATHs, or which has commit access to a vital source code repository can lead to the compromise of many other accounts and systems via trojans. In this case, compromising one account escalates authority system-wide; administrators cannot abdicate responsibility for password strength because they cannot abdicate responsibility for system health.

You cannot answer this question without answering the following question

If a user's password is compromised, does that only put that user/that user's data at risk, or does it also put other users at risk?

If the system does not compartmentalize accounts, then a user cannot keep their data safe by choosing appropriate credentials, so administrators must be responsible, in part, for the overall security of the community.

If the system does compartmentalize accounts, then a user can only harm themselves by choosing weak credentials, so shifting responsibility to the user can be a reasonable.

For example, email systems are well comparmentalized; compromising one account does not compromise others much. Some accounts might be set up to not treat as spam mail from other accounts, but there are many other ways to impersonate email so the ability to send email as a user is not often a huge escalation of authority.

But file-systems and source code repositories are not well comparmentalized. Compromising one account whose ~/bin directory is on other users' PATH, or who has commit access to a vital source code repository can lead to the compromise of many other accounts and systems via trojans.

You cannot answer this question without answering the following question

If a user's password is compromised, does that only put that user/that user's data at risk, or does it also put other users at risk?

If the system does not compartmentalize accounts, then a user cannot keep their data safe by choosing appropriate credentials, so administrators must be responsible, in part, for the overall security of the community.

If the system does compartmentalize accounts, then a user can only harm themselves by choosing weak credentials, so shifting responsibility to the user can be a reasonable.

For example, email systems are well compartmentalized; compromising one account does not compromise others much. Some accounts might be set up to not treat as spam mail from other accounts, but there are many other ways to impersonate email so the ability to send email as a user is not often a huge escalation of authority. An administrator can abdicate responsibility for password strength without compromising the security of the system.

But file systems and source code repositories are not well compartmentalized. Compromising one account whose ~/bin directory is on other users' PATHs, or which has commit access to a vital source code repository can lead to the compromise of many other accounts and systems via trojans. In this case, compromising one account escalates authority system-wide; administrators cannot abdicate responsibility for password strength because they cannot abdicate responsibility for system health.