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I want to harden the security of my host system and side by side running virtual machines while testing some files for malware in one of the virtual machines. Here comes a list of questions that I hope you can answer.

- Network Adapters
One thing that I am worried about is the possible spreading of malware from one virtual machine to another. Most of the virtual machines i am executing side by side at the moment are using the same network adapter. Could I somehow minimize the risk by allocating a separate virtual network adapter to the virtual machine I am using for malware testing purposes?

- Separation of Networks
I have read about separating the networks in some other threads. Could I achieve this by connecting an additional network card to my pc and connect the machine that i use for testing the malware to one of the cards? Furthermore I have read that one way to achieve separation would be to disconnect the machine from the network. For my work the internet connection inside all virtual machines and inside the host system is essential at all times so I will have to exclude this possible solution.

- USB Device Drivers
Studying another interesting thread covering the same subject I have come across the claim that a mouse driver could possibly allow a buffer overflow attack. Here is the link to the addressed thread, the post was created by Tim Williams.

Could somebody please explain if the mousedriver would have to be installed inside the guest system or would it be enough to have it running on the host system to cause the vulnerability?

- Mouse integration
Furthermore I have assimilated the information that the mouse integration (the plugin or option that makes mouse movement from the guest to the host machine flawless) could be a possible vulnerability. Is it really better or even necessary to disable this option to harden the security?

- Separating CPU Cores.
Do I have to worry about the guest VM using the same CPU cores like the host system? Is there a way to allocate for example one CPU core to one VM?

I want to harden the security of my host system and side by side running virtual machines while testing some files for malware in one of the virtual machines. Here comes a list of questions that I hope you can answer.

- Network Adapters
One thing that I am worried about is the possible spreading of malware from one virtual machine to another. Most of the virtual machines i am executing side by side at the moment are using the same network adapter. Could I somehow minimize the risk by allocating a separate virtual network adapter to the virtual machine I am using for malware testing purposes?

- Separation of Networks
I have read about separating the networks in some other threads. Could I achieve this by connecting an additional network card to my pc and connect the machine that i use for testing the malware to one of the cards? Furthermore I have read that one way to achieve separation would be to disconnect the machine from the network. For my work the internet connection inside all virtual machines and inside the host system is essential at all times so I will have to exclude this possible solution.

- USB Device Drivers
Studying another interesting thread covering the same subject I have come across the claim that a mouse driver could possibly allow a buffer overflow attack. Here is the link to the addressed thread, the post was created by Tim Williams.

Could somebody please explain if the mousedriver would have to be installed inside the guest system or would it be enough to have it running on the host system to cause the vulnerability?

- Mouse integration
Furthermore I have assimilated the information that the mouse integration (the plugin or option that makes mouse movement from the guest to the host machine flawless) could be a possible vulnerability. Is it really better or even necessary to disable this option to harden the security?

- Separating CPU Cores.
Do I have to worry about the guest VM using the same CPU cores like the host system? Is there a way to allocate for example one CPU core to one VM?

I want to harden the security of my host system and side by side running virtual machines while testing some files for malware in one of the virtual machines. Here comes a list of questions that I hope you can answer.

- Network Adapters
One thing that I am worried about is the possible spreading of malware from one virtual machine to another. Most of the virtual machines i am executing side by side at the moment are using the same network adapter. Could I somehow minimize the risk by allocating a separate virtual network adapter to the virtual machine I am using for malware testing purposes?

- Separation of Networks
I have read about separating the networks in some other threads. Could I achieve this by connecting an additional network card to my pc and connect the possibly contaminated VM to it? Furthermore I have read that one way to achieve separation would be to disconnect the machine from the network. For my work the internet connection inside all virtual machines and inside the host system is essential at all times so I will have to exclude this possible solution.

- USB Device Drivers
Studying another interesting thread covering the same subject I have come across the claim that a mouse driver could possibly allow a buffer overflow attack. Here is the link to the addressed thread, the post was created by Tim Williams.

Could somebody please explain if the mousedriver would have to be installed inside the guest system or would it be enough to have it running on the host system to cause the vulnerability?

- Mouse integration
Furthermore I have assimilated the information that the mouse integration (the plugin or option that makes mouse movement from the guest to the host machine flawless) could be a possible vulnerability. Is it really better or even necessary to disable this option to harden the security?

- Separation of Networks
Someone has mentioned in another thread that the usage of the same network by host and guest or different guests could be a vulnerability. I need a internet connection in my guest OS so i am using the NAT network adapter for my guest machine. I could use a USB Modem or a second network card (which would still be connected to the same router in my case) to get my guest OS connected to the internet. Is that what is meant by separating the networks from each other or to avoid the use of a shared folder?

- Separating CPU Cores.
Do I have to worry about the guest VM using the same CPU cores like the host system? Is there a way to allocate for example one CPU core to one VM?

I want to harden the security of my host system and side by side running virtual machines while testing some files for malware in one of the virtual machines. Here comes a list of questions that I hope you can answer.

- Network Adapters
One thing that I am worried about is the possible spreading of malware from one virtual machine to another. Most of the virtual machines i am executing side by side at the moment are using the same network adapter. Could I somehow minimize the risk by allocating a separate virtual network adapter to the virtual machine I am using for malware testing purposes?

- Separation of Networks
I have read about separating the networks in some other threads. Could I achieve this by connecting an additional network card to my pc and connect the machine that i use for testing the malware to one of the cards? Furthermore I have read that one way to achieve separation would be to disconnect the machine from the network. For my work the internet connection inside all virtual machines and inside the host system is essential at all times so I will have to exclude this possible solution.

- USB Device Drivers
Studying another interesting thread covering the same subject I have come across the claim that a mouse driver could possibly allow a buffer overflow attack. Here is the link to the addressed thread, the post was created by Tim Williams.

Could somebody please explain if the mousedriver would have to be installed inside the guest system or would it be enough to have it running on the host system to cause the vulnerability?

- Mouse integration
Furthermore I have assimilated the information that the mouse integration (the plugin or option that makes mouse movement from the guest to the host machine flawless) could be a possible vulnerability. Is it really better or even necessary to disable this option to harden the security?

- Separating CPU Cores.
Do I have to worry about the guest VM using the same CPU cores like the host system? Is there a way to allocate for example one CPU core to one VM?

I want to harden the security of my host system and side by side running virtual machines while testing some files for malware in one of the virtual machines. Here comes a list of questions that i hope you can answer.

- Network Adapters
One thing that i am worried about is the possible spreading of malware from one virtual machine to another. Most of the virtual machines i am executing side by side at the moment are using the same network adapter. Could i somehow minimize the risk by allocating a seperate virtual network adapter to the virtual machine i am using for malware testing purpuses?

- Seperation of Networks
I have read about seperating the networks in some other threads. Could i achieve this by connecting an additional network card to my pc and connect the possibly contaminated VM to it? Furthermore i have read that one way to achieve seperation would be to disconnect the machine from the network. For my work the internet connection inside all virtual machines and inside the host system is essentlial at all times so i will have to exclude this possible solution.

- USB Device Drivers
Studying another interesting thread covering the same subject i have come across the claim that a mousedriver could possibly allow a buffer overflow attack. Here is the link to the adressed thread, the post was created by Tim Williams. How secure are virtual machines really? False sense of security?. Could somebody please explain if the mousedriver would have to be installed inside the guest system or would it be eough to have it running on the host system to cause the vulnerability?

- Mouse integration
Furthermore i have assimilated the information that the mouse integration (the plugin or option that makes mousemovement from the guest to the host machine flawless) could be a possible vulnerability. Is it really better or even necessary to disable this option to harden the security?

- Seperation of Networks
Someone has mentioned in another thread that the usage of the same network by host and guest or different guests could be a vulnerability. I need a internet connection in my guest OS so i am using the NAT networkadapter for my guest machine. I could use a USB Modem or a second networkcard (which would still be connected to the same router in my case) to get my guest OS connected to the internet. Is that what is meant by seperating the networks from each other or to avoid the use of a shared folder?

- Seperating CPU Cores.
Do i have to worry about the guest VM using the same CPU cores like the host system? Is there a way to alocate for example one CPU core to one VM?

I want to harden the security of my host system and side by side running virtual machines while testing some files for malware in one of the virtual machines. Here comes a list of questions that I hope you can answer.

- Network Adapters
One thing that I am worried about is the possible spreading of malware from one virtual machine to another. Most of the virtual machines i am executing side by side at the moment are using the same network adapter. Could I somehow minimize the risk by allocating a separate virtual network adapter to the virtual machine I am using for malware testing purposes?

- Separation of Networks
I have read about separating the networks in some other threads. Could I achieve this by connecting an additional network card to my pc and connect the possibly contaminated VM to it? Furthermore I have read that one way to achieve separation would be to disconnect the machine from the network. For my work the internet connection inside all virtual machines and inside the host system is essential at all times so I will have to exclude this possible solution.

- USB Device Drivers
Studying another interesting thread covering the same subject I have come across the claim that a mouse driver could possibly allow a buffer overflow attack. Here is the link to the addressed thread, the post was created by Tim Williams.

Could somebody please explain if the mousedriver would have to be installed inside the guest system or would it be enough to have it running on the host system to cause the vulnerability?

- Mouse integration
Furthermore I have assimilated the information that the mouse integration (the plugin or option that makes mouse movement from the guest to the host machine flawless) could be a possible vulnerability. Is it really better or even necessary to disable this option to harden the security?

- Separation of Networks
Someone has mentioned in another thread that the usage of the same network by host and guest or different guests could be a vulnerability. I need a internet connection in my guest OS so i am using the NAT network adapter for my guest machine. I could use a USB Modem or a second network card (which would still be connected to the same router in my case) to get my guest OS connected to the internet. Is that what is meant by separating the networks from each other or to avoid the use of a shared folder?

- Separating CPU Cores.
Do I have to worry about the guest VM using the same CPU cores like the host system? Is there a way to allocate for example one CPU core to one VM?