Timeline for Sign PKCS#7 and verify PKCS#7 signature with OpenSSL
Current License: CC BY-SA 3.0
10 events
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| Oct 7, 2021 at 6:47 | history | edited | CommunityBot |
replaced http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc with https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc
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| Nov 18, 2018 at 16:07 | comment | added | dave_thompson_085 | @FranklinYu: recipient certainly chooses (somehow) which root(s) it trusts to validate any chain against. But if it wants to choose 'must be the one the sender sent' and the message was altered, receiver can't be sure what the sender sent unless it is outer-signed (and that signature verifies). | |
| Nov 16, 2018 at 18:55 | comment | added | Franklin Yu | For the last case where one valid chain is replaced with another valid one, if recipient want to prevent this case I guess he/she can just pin the root? | |
| Mar 17, 2017 at 13:14 | history | edited | CommunityBot |
replaced http://security.stackexchange.com/ with https://security.stackexchange.com/
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| Feb 6, 2015 at 12:09 | comment | added | dave_thompson_085 | @tysonite see edit | |
| Feb 6, 2015 at 12:08 | history | edited | dave_thompson_085 | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
added 2725 characters in body
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| Feb 3, 2015 at 19:40 | vote | accept | tysonite | ||
| Feb 3, 2015 at 19:39 | comment | added | tysonite | However, if I need to transfer some certificates (e.g. valid chain) from CA to other end-entity using PKCS#7, how can I be sure that the chain or/and EE's certificate was not altered? Can you propose other approaches than CMS/PKCS#7? I referred to my question number 2. For instance, I found out that CMPv2 (RFC 4210) protocol (as I understand, it is for on-line enrollments) allows to do that. It may (as per my understanding) sign the content of whole message containing chain of certificates. | |
| Feb 3, 2015 at 19:31 | comment | added | tysonite | Dave, thank you for the answer. It becomes more clear. | |
| Jan 31, 2015 at 2:59 | history | answered | dave_thompson_085 | CC BY-SA 3.0 |