Timeline for Technology that can survive a "Rubber-Hose attack"
Current License: CC BY-SA 3.0
14 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| May 2, 2016 at 19:06 | comment | added | Gaia | In more practical terms, Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme (SSSS) is a general software implementation of bitcoin multisignature wallets. Simpler implementation thus is storing the password in question inside a multisig wallet, or have it's private key (or section thereof) be the password. | |
| Apr 15, 2016 at 8:02 | comment | added | Tomáš Zato | That solution reminds me of Fidelius Charm from Harry Potter. | |
| Mar 6, 2015 at 12:40 | comment | added | David says Reinstate Monica | Doesn't this also have the problem of needing everyone to be responsive in order to use the password? This sounds like it could get very complicated to use on a normal basis, especially if the shareholders are across multiple timezones. | |
| Mar 6, 2015 at 8:05 | comment | added | Palec | @Aron So the torturers will know you’re probably lying. But that’s what they should expect anyway – see the Q&A on Skeptics I linked. Even passwords can be stored and forgotten. AFAIK that is best practice when it comes to root passwords. | |
| Mar 6, 2015 at 7:57 | comment | added | Aron | @Palec the only physical encryption key I own and do not carry on my person comes from my bank. The only reason I do not carry it on my person is because it is too friggin large. I used to carry my RSA token everywhere. Besides, most people don't use real keys, they use passwords, which are inflated to key length. | |
| Mar 6, 2015 at 7:53 | comment | added | Palec | @Aron: The key itself is easily verifiable, but people usually don’t remember their keys. They store them somewhere. And getting the key from a remote location is not as fast and easy. | |
| Mar 6, 2015 at 1:29 | comment | added | Aron | @Palec Your comment makes no sense in this context. The key is an easily verifiable fact. The only questionable part of the attach scheme is how you can reliably identify the keyholders, which, is only a concern if you cared for minimizing the usage of torture. | |
| Mar 6, 2015 at 0:12 | comment | added | eggyal | @PlasmaHH: if the keyholders are distributed across multiple jurisdictions, it may not be feasible for a single attacker to compel them (through whatever means) before one of their number discovers the attack and destroys his key part. | |
| Mar 5, 2015 at 22:25 | comment | added | Palec | Low efficacy of torture is a serious problem here. | |
| Mar 5, 2015 at 10:57 | comment | added | March Ho | @PlasmaHH Willing and able are completely different. The US government is willing to torture all of the Taliban and ISIS commanders, but is unable to do so. | |
| Mar 5, 2015 at 9:45 | comment | added | PlasmaHH | @MarchHo: I don't see why it should be much more doable to torture a single individual than a bunch of individuals sharing the key. If you commit to torture then I don't see any limits on what you are willing to do. | |
| Mar 5, 2015 at 9:35 | comment | added | March Ho | @PlasmaHH If you consider rounding up and torturing everyone whom you shared the partial key doable for that adversary, then there is no defence against it getting access to your data, other than to make it impossible to decrypt by yourself as well. If you can decrypt it and they have unlimited power over you, they can decrypt it too. | |
| Mar 5, 2015 at 9:07 | comment | added | PlasmaHH | Or a quorum of people to be tortured. It makes that attack harder, not impossible. | |
| Mar 4, 2015 at 23:38 | history | answered | Jeff Ferland♦ | CC BY-SA 3.0 |