Timeline for Could a compromised root CA impersonate any SSL certificate?
Current License: CC BY-SA 3.0
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| Jul 4, 2015 at 2:46 | comment | added | Steffen Ullrich | @daveonhols: it is detectable because the certificate changes and you might look at the fingerprint. But nobody would check the fingerprint on each request and probably does not even remember the previous fingerprint. And here the described extensions help. It does not matter who issued the fake certificate, because the new certificate has a different public key than the original one. If not than not only the CA but the owner of the certificate itself got compromised in which case the attacker has access to the private key and does not need to compromise the CA. | |
| Jul 3, 2015 at 21:46 | comment | added | daveonhols | Thanks, but specifically I am not interested in whether the browser would accept it, rather whether a user looking at the certificate could know that it was not the original. I mean, is this type of MITM attack detectable on the client side by someone who is directly looking for it? Does it matter which root CA is compromised (i.e. the original root CA or a different one)? | |
| Jul 3, 2015 at 14:56 | history | edited | Steffen Ullrich | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
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| Jul 3, 2015 at 14:20 | comment | added | StackzOfZtuff | s/IE with ESET/IE with EMET/ (Blog guy says it works. I don't know. I've never tried this.) | |
| Jul 2, 2015 at 22:50 | history | edited | Steffen Ullrich | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
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| Jul 2, 2015 at 21:51 | history | edited | Steffen Ullrich | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
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| Jul 2, 2015 at 21:39 | history | edited | Steffen Ullrich | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
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| Jul 2, 2015 at 21:32 | history | answered | Steffen Ullrich | CC BY-SA 3.0 |