- Do not reveal a list of usernames. Don't make it any easier... This includes not revealing if the username is valid or not, when refusing the login.
- Require a strong password policy - long and complex.
- Make the "forgot password" mechanism easy and noticable. (Of course, make sure that's secure too).
- Each time a login request fails, log this to the database. Make sure you write the username, IP address, time, etc.
- If numerous failed requests are received for a specific username, mark that user in the database as locked for a short time. Also encourage the user to use the "forgot password" feature, if this is in the same session.
- How many failed requests? It dependsIt depends. In short, whatever makes sense for your site, the exact number is not critical.
- How long should the user be locked for? Short intervals. Mathematically, it doesn't really matter, as long as you have a strong password policy. Realistically, start with very short interval of a few minutes, then if it continues make it incrementally longer. E.g. after 5 bad tries, lock for 5 minutes; after another 3 bad tries, lock for 15; after another 2, lock for 30; etc.
- Do not lock user accounts permanently. This leads to Account DoS. And, can also cost your support personell a lot of time and money.
- Despite the previous point/s, if your site is veryveryvery sensitive, e.g. a banking app, you might want to consider locking permanently till further notice, e.g. have the customer come into his branch.
- Locks should be by username, on the database. Not by sessionId, and not in the webserver session.
- If you receive many failed requests with different usernames, but from the same IP address - implement incremental locking like above, but with wider grace and shorter intervals.
- Provide a "forgot username" feature, in addition to the forgot password.
- Administrator accounts should have shorter grace, longer intervals, and never permanently lock them out.
- In any event, when locking a user or IP, send an alert to administrators. Not for repeated locking, though - you don't want to flood the admin's inbox. But if it does continue, then elevate the alert level after a few times.
- Don't use CAPTCHA - the minimal added difficulty is trivial, in relation to the value of accessing the user's password. (There are many ways around it, CAPTCHA is fundamentally broken, regardless of implementationbroken, regardless of implementation).
- Of course, as @rox0r stated, multi-factor authentication might be appropriate for you.
- Another alternative, is whats known as "adaptive authentication" - if the user failed the login, ask for additional information (that had been pre-registered). Depending on additional risk-factors (e.g. location, time patterns different from usual, etc), escalate the information required to successfully authenticate. For example RSA's AdaptiveAuthentication product does this.
replaced http://security.stackexchange.com/ with https://security.stackexchange.com/
- Do not reveal a list of usernames. Don't make it any easier... This includes not revealing if the username is valid or not, when refusing the login.
- Require a strong password policy - long and complex.
- Make the "forgot password" mechanism easy and noticable. (Of course, make sure that's secure too).
- Each time a login request fails, log this to the database. Make sure you write the username, IP address, time, etc.
- If numerous failed requests are received for a specific username, mark that user in the database as locked for a short time. Also encourage the user to use the "forgot password" feature, if this is in the same session.
- How many failed requests? It depends. In short, whatever makes sense for your site, the exact number is not critical.
- How long should the user be locked for? Short intervals. Mathematically, it doesn't really matter, as long as you have a strong password policy. Realistically, start with very short interval of a few minutes, then if it continues make it incrementally longer. E.g. after 5 bad tries, lock for 5 minutes; after another 3 bad tries, lock for 15; after another 2, lock for 30; etc.
- Do not lock user accounts permanently. This leads to Account DoS. And, can also cost your support personell a lot of time and money.
- Despite the previous point/s, if your site is veryveryvery sensitive, e.g. a banking app, you might want to consider locking permanently till further notice, e.g. have the customer come into his branch.
- Locks should be by username, on the database. Not by sessionId, and not in the webserver session.
- If you receive many failed requests with different usernames, but from the same IP address - implement incremental locking like above, but with wider grace and shorter intervals.
- Provide a "forgot username" feature, in addition to the forgot password.
- Administrator accounts should have shorter grace, longer intervals, and never permanently lock them out.
- In any event, when locking a user or IP, send an alert to administrators. Not for repeated locking, though - you don't want to flood the admin's inbox. But if it does continue, then elevate the alert level after a few times.
- Don't use CAPTCHA - the minimal added difficulty is trivial, in relation to the value of accessing the user's password. (There are many ways around it, CAPTCHA is fundamentally broken, regardless of implementation).
- Of course, as @rox0r stated, multi-factor authentication might be appropriate for you.
- Another alternative, is whats known as "adaptive authentication" - if the user failed the login, ask for additional information (that had been pre-registered). Depending on additional risk-factors (e.g. location, time patterns different from usual, etc), escalate the information required to successfully authenticate. For example RSA's AdaptiveAuthentication product does this.
- Do not reveal a list of usernames. Don't make it any easier... This includes not revealing if the username is valid or not, when refusing the login.
- Require a strong password policy - long and complex.
- Make the "forgot password" mechanism easy and noticable. (Of course, make sure that's secure too).
- Each time a login request fails, log this to the database. Make sure you write the username, IP address, time, etc.
- If numerous failed requests are received for a specific username, mark that user in the database as locked for a short time. Also encourage the user to use the "forgot password" feature, if this is in the same session.
- How many failed requests? It depends. In short, whatever makes sense for your site, the exact number is not critical.
- How long should the user be locked for? Short intervals. Mathematically, it doesn't really matter, as long as you have a strong password policy. Realistically, start with very short interval of a few minutes, then if it continues make it incrementally longer. E.g. after 5 bad tries, lock for 5 minutes; after another 3 bad tries, lock for 15; after another 2, lock for 30; etc.
- Do not lock user accounts permanently. This leads to Account DoS. And, can also cost your support personell a lot of time and money.
- Despite the previous point/s, if your site is veryveryvery sensitive, e.g. a banking app, you might want to consider locking permanently till further notice, e.g. have the customer come into his branch.
- Locks should be by username, on the database. Not by sessionId, and not in the webserver session.
- If you receive many failed requests with different usernames, but from the same IP address - implement incremental locking like above, but with wider grace and shorter intervals.
- Provide a "forgot username" feature, in addition to the forgot password.
- Administrator accounts should have shorter grace, longer intervals, and never permanently lock them out.
- In any event, when locking a user or IP, send an alert to administrators. Not for repeated locking, though - you don't want to flood the admin's inbox. But if it does continue, then elevate the alert level after a few times.
- Don't use CAPTCHA - the minimal added difficulty is trivial, in relation to the value of accessing the user's password. (There are many ways around it, CAPTCHA is fundamentally broken, regardless of implementation).
- Of course, as @rox0r stated, multi-factor authentication might be appropriate for you.
- Another alternative, is whats known as "adaptive authentication" - if the user failed the login, ask for additional information (that had been pre-registered). Depending on additional risk-factors (e.g. location, time patterns different from usual, etc), escalate the information required to successfully authenticate. For example RSA's AdaptiveAuthentication product does this.
First, it makes sense to understand which scenarios/attacks you're intending to handle:
- Valid user innocently mistypes the wrong password
- Valid user really forgot his password - and is willing to manually try anything he can think of
- Attacker is manually trying to guess someone else's password
- Attacker is using automated tool to brute-force a specific user's password
- Attacker is using automated tool to brute-force any possible user's password (i.e. breadth-first search)
- Attacker wants to block a specific user from accessing the site
- Attacker wants to block most users from accessing the site
- Attacker wants to block administrators from accessing the site
- Attacker wants to create a lot of manual work, or cost your org a lot in some other way.
(See? Not so simple is it...) And there are different solutions for each part of these...
- Do not reveal a list of usernames. Don't make it any easier... This includes not revealing if the username is valid or not, when refusing the login.
- Require a strong password policy - long and complex.
- Make the "forgot password" mechanism easy and noticable. (Of course, make sure that's secure too).
- Each time a login request fails, log this to the database. Make sure you write the username, IP address, time, etc.
- If numerous failed requests are received for a specific username, mark that user in the database as locked for a short time. Also encourage the user to use the "forgot password" feature, if this is in the same session.
- How many failed requests? It depends. In short, whatever makes sense for your site, the exact number is not critical.
- How long should the user be locked for? Short intervals. Mathematically, it doesn't really matter, as long as you have a strong password policy. Realistically, start with very short interval of a few minutes, then if it continues make it incrementally longer. E.g. after 5 bad tries, lock for 5 minutes; after another 3 bad tries, lock for 15; after another 2, lock for 30; etc.
- Do not lock user accounts permanently. This leads to Account DoS. And, can also cost your support personell a lot of time and money.
- Despite the previous point/s, if your site is veryveryvery sensitive, e.g. a banking app, you might want to consider locking permanently till further notice, e.g. have the customer come into his branch.
- Locks should be by username, on the database. Not by sessionId, and not in the webserver session.
- If you receive many failed requests with different usernames, but from the same IP address - implement incremental locking like above, but with wider grace and shorter intervals.
- Provide a "forgot username" feature, in addition to the forgot password.
- Administrator accounts should have shorter grace, longer intervals, and never permanently lock them out.
- In any event, when locking a user or IP, send an alert to administrators. Not for repeated locking, though - you don't want to flood the admin's inbox. But if it does continue, then elevate the alert level after a few times.
- Don't use CAPTCHA - the minimal added difficulty is trivial, in relation to the value of accessing the user's password. (There are many ways around it, CAPTCHA is fundamentally broken, regardless of implementation).
- Of course, as @rox0r stated, multi-factor authentication might be appropriate for you.
- Another alternative, is whats known as "adaptive authentication" - if the user failed the login, ask for additional information (that had been pre-registered). Depending on additional risk-factors (e.g. location, time patterns different from usual, etc), escalate the information required to successfully authenticate. For example RSA's AdaptiveAuthentication product does this.