It is in fact doubtful that "Nation States" are really interested in cracking bcrypt. Cracking bcrypt is what you do when you purloined a list of password hashes from a Web site, and want to obtain some of the passwords to be able to log into these accounts, on that site, or on other sites under the assumption that people tend to reuse passwords. Logging into accounts is active: it tends to leave traces. Spy agencies who deal with some "serious customers" (people who plant bombs, not people who send spam emails), usually, abhor leaving traces of their activities.
What a Nation State would really love is to be able to break password-based encryption, the usual suspects being then GnuPG (with the command-line option
-c to password-protect a file) and TrueCrypt (for the people who still use it). Neither uses bcrypt as password-based key derivation function; GnuPG uses its own construction called Iterated and Salted S2K, while TrueCrypt relies on PBKDF2 with 1000 or 2000 iterations (depending on the underlying hash function). There are various estimates of how fast one can go about cracking passwords with these functions; this depends on the number of iterations, which may vary (especially with GnuPG, where this is done with a simple command-line option). See for instance this question for some discussion and pointers.
Basically, both for GnuPG and TrueCrypt, the easy, efficient, and above all discreet hardware to use is GPU, because these are off-the-shelf and benefit from very high production volumes, thus allowing for heavy cost reduction. While theoretically some dedicated ASIC would be even better (almost by definition), it would take a huge number of units (think millions) to actually make it worthwhile from the attacker's point of view. In the case of bcrypt, we often talk about FPGA because bcrypt is quite GPU-unfriendly; but this does not extend to PBKDF2 and OpenPGP's S2K, both hugely benefiting from GPU and making FPGA, comparatively, less attractive.
In my experience, governments are very good at spending money, but not necessarily at getting their money's worth. This partially comes from the fact that a government is not a business, and thus does not have much incentive in terms of cost reduction and RoI. However, let's suppose that, by extraordinary, some big Nation State actually achieved efficient usage of taxpayer money. Then we can make estimates.
For really serious attackers who think in the long term, the dominant cost is electrical power; that cost exceeds the cost of buying and replacing the hardware. For computing centres, the relevant notion is that of Power Usage Effectiveness, which qualifies how much extra energy is needed when feeding your hardware (for cooling, lighting and so on); a PUE of about 1.2 would be already quite good (that's about what Amazon, Microsoft and Google say they achieve). For some discussion on PUE, see this report, especially section 4.
Let's throw some figures at it. An AMD R9 290X can compute about 4 billions of SHA-1 per second (see this site); a 2000-round PBKDF2 with SHA-1 involves 4000 SHA-1 invocations (2000 HMAC/SHA-1 calls), so that's 1 million per second on that GPU. That beast is rated at 250W of Thermal Design Power, a figure that we will use for our estimates (in fact, GPU involved in such compute-intensive tasks tend to consume more than their advertised TDP). Thus, in one hour, the system will hash 3.6 billions of passwords, and consume 300 W·h (250 W·h for the GPU, but this becomes 300 with a PUE of 1.2). Average electricity cost in the USA is about 0.10$ per kW·h, so this put the cost at 0.03$ for hashing 3.6 billions of password. Said otherwise, for 1$, you get to hash 120 billions of password. This is close to 237 so let's keep that figure.
Now, the NSA has an annual budget estimated to a bit more than 10 billions of US dollars (the real budget is classified, but the money comes from taxes so it can still be estimated quite accurately). Assuming that they spend all of it on cracking TrueCrypt passwords, and do so very efficiently (both notions being quite preposterous), then this would allow them to crack up to 10 billions of passwords with an average entropy of 38 bits, per year (38 and not 37, because on average brute force explores half of the space before succeeding). I find it utterly improbable that they could really achieve even 1/100th of that performance, though -- both because they have a lot more other things to do with their budget, and because I don't believe that they would achieve Google-like efficiency. That would put them at 100 millions of passwords per year, as long as the passwords have 38 bits of entropy on average.
While 100 millions if a huge figure, remember that entropy can bite them hard. If they stumble upon a password with 66 bits of entropy (e.g. a password generated with the correct horse method expanded to 6 words, thus still highly human-compatible), then it would take the NSA 2.5 years to crack that password (on average), and they would not be cracking other passwords during all that time. The password had better be valuable -- and the terrorists would also have to be courteous enough to delay the execution of their nefarious plans for a few years, so that the NSA has time to catch up.
Note that TrueCrypt is not very good, as far as password hashing is concerned. It uses PBKDF2, which can be very efficiently optimized on GPU (contrary to bcrypt). It uses only 2000 iterations, a very meagre value. And yet, a single human-compatible password can still defeat the whole of an idealized NSA that would have magically become more efficient than any other government agency in the World.
Presumably, an efficient government agency involved in cracking passwords would have made the same estimates as above, and concluded that they'd better not invest all their budget into password cracking, since it can be so easily defeated. From this I conclude that password-cracking abilities of Nation States are not as high as they are often cracked up to be.