I have seen in many places that people say that headers of the following types is a vulnerability:


I can see that this gives the attacker additional information so that he can verify the known bugs on these platforms and then abuse them. But it seems to me that removing these headers can only protect you against very simple script kiddies and any serious attacks would uncover this information rather easily. E.g.

  • There has to be a way in which IIS responds differently or fails differently when intricate random garbage is sent to it compared to other servers
  • A list of known vulnerabilities in ASP.NET can be tried one by one to see if any apply + the same point as above applies to ASP.NET itself
  • Some other similar manipulations

So all in all it seems that any serious adversary would really be able to uncover that information rather simply.

And after all will removing the headers give you any benefits apart from very simple protection from script kiddies who will first target the sites that have the vulnerability like in a popular quote:

“You don’t have to run faster than the bear to get away. You just have to run faster than the guy next to you.”

P.S. You probably have much more serious issues if this information disclosure can lead to a real vulnerability.

P.P.S. There is no point to have this headers anyway since it will even benefit performance (quite negligibly though), so it's a good idea to get rid of them, but I am still curious about the whole "security" argument here

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    While it may not help in targeted attacks, reducing version info leakage will reduce opportunistic attacks. – Neil Smithline Feb 5 '16 at 16:34
  • Scenario: In the entire header it includes a lot of info (Look at panopticlick.com) and I know of one webmaster who was looking through logs and was able to warn a visitor that they had a virus on board. The mix of extensions, fonts, etc., can be pretty unique to your computer. Do you care if you can be individually singled out from other traffic? – SDsolar May 25 '17 at 6:26

OWASP defines Information Leakage as a vulnerability, so the debate is really on whether or not the specific version information should be classified as "Information Leakage".

As @Oasiscircle mentions, this information can be used as a starting point for attackers who know of specific vulnerabilities associated with specific versions. We know attackers use botnets to scan servers looking for version fingerprints, and they use this information to maintain databases of application versions and server addresses. Shodan provides a widely used database of this info. When a new exploit is introduced that targets a specific version, or if an attacker develops a 0day exploit against a version, these attackers do a simple select of their databases and strike quickly, hoping to catch some of these machines before they're patched.

Does that make knowing a specific version number a vulnerability? Not directly, but it puts you in the cross-hairs of a field of snipers, each with a hair trigger and the motivation to strike first. I'll leave it to you to determine for yourself if you consider that a vulnerability.

  • Well, if you say they do constant scanning and maintain the database, won't they do something more reliable? Like the points I mentioned to figure out the real values no matter what you return? – Ilya Chernomordik Feb 5 '16 at 16:31
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    @IlyaChernomordik, no, reliability is not worth the effort. It's the difference between a "targeted attack" and a "target of opportunity." These attackers don't care which server they attack; as long as they get a new server the attack is worth it. So if they have a list of 1000 potential victims, they will blast the attack at all 1000 at once. Even if 900 are already patched, and 90 are mislabeled to throw off attackers, and 5 are honeypots, that means the attacker still controls 5 new servers. He doesn't care if he has some bad data, as long as it's effective enough. – John Deters Feb 5 '16 at 18:41

I'm generally dubious about the benefits - as @MarkBuffalo says, lots of attackers will try every attack they know on every server they find, whether it's likely to work or not (even to the extent of trying Windows specific attacks against systems reporting that they're running RHEL).

However, it's not information you need to give out, so I am generally in favour of removing it, where this can be accomplished with minimal effort. This sometimes means reducing the output to just the name of the server (e.g. Apache, IIS) rather than completely removing the Server header, as entirely removing the header may well require introducing new software elements into the server stack.

For example, it takes one line in apache.conf to reduce an httpd Server header to "Apache", but the addition of a proxy to reduce it further. In that case, it seems safer to stick with the minimal line, rather than add an additional element, which may introduce its own flaws.

Similarly, it's easy to see when a site runs Wordpress, but I'd still recommend removing the readme file - it's just not needed, and acts a bit like the bowl of brown M&Ms rider that some rock bands infamously used: you can check it easily, and it shows whether other steps are likely to have been taken.


Let's say that today a vulnerability got announced for all Microsoft IIS 7.5 servers with a small range of ASP Net versions. I'm a malicious attacker, and I want to figure out as many servers that I can exploit as possible before sysadmins patch up the vulnerability. Wouldn't it be a much easier problem to figure out if I could ask each individual server if they are vulnerable rather than having to try the vulnerability on every single server? Plus I could log all this information on a per-server basis and know exactly who I want to attack the instant a vulnerability is found for any type of server.

Hiding your version information will not stop an attack from happening, but it will make you less of a target if attackers are looking for a specific version of hardware or software. Security by obscurity doesn't mean you're safe, but it does slow people down sometimes, and that's exactly what's needed for day zero vulnerabilities.

  • It's far more efficient to just try the vulnerability on all random servers than asking them. Some may exclude this, some may be lying. You also won't need to know who to connect to if your vulnerability introduces something to phone home. – Mark Buffalo Feb 5 '16 at 15:23
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    So no more value in implementing it, than in the quote then :) @MarkBuffalo: unless this vulnerability takes 5000 requests to execute. So it's more like not showing your purse full of gold on a black market which will not stop any dedicated thieves, but might help about some robbers just wandering around – Ilya Chernomordik Feb 5 '16 at 15:26
  • @IlyaChernomordik Good point! – Mark Buffalo Feb 8 '16 at 17:28

Well say there was a new, serious vulnerability discovered in ASP.NET 4.0.30319.

Attackers can easily find vulnerable servers by using a search engine like Shodan: https://www.shodan.io/search?query=X-AspNet-Version%3A4.0.30319

Hiding the information banners protect you from non-targeted attacks when an attacker just wants some servers to compromise for adding to their botnet.

  • So the attackers (or at least these type you mentioned) won't be bothered to use some special tricks to verify the real version? Like checking for some behaviour that this exact version exhibit and instead just do a this very simple thing? – Ilya Chernomordik Feb 8 '16 at 10:07
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    Yes, as it is not specifically targeted at your infrastructure. If it was a targeted attack, an attacker would be able to determine which exact version was running, as you say. – SilverlightFox Feb 8 '16 at 10:29

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