Out of curiosity and with the hope of helping other beginners and journalists.
The current Apple vs DOJ standoff in a nutshell - Apple is resisting DOJ with statements like what they're asking is "something too dangerous to create". A summary with a quote from The Washington Post:
The order does not ask Apple to break the phone’s encryption, but rather to disable the feature that wipes the data on the phone after 10 incorrect tries at entering a password. That way, the government can try to crack the password using “brute-force”.
Binaries of such iphone os with the brute-force features disabled would enable anyone in possession of said binaries to just flash any iphone in their possession which opens it to brute-force attacks.
Now assuming this brute-force protection acts as a compensation for weak passwords (if the game really is over after 10 tries, the bar is set pretty low)
How feasible would be the following crude attempt:
- Cloning the phone data
- Running the cloned image(s) in an emulator / Virtual Machine
- Cluster runs online attacks on a bunch of VMs.
The issue preventing virtualization, as stated in the apple iphone security whitepaper I assume is all the ties to hardwareIDs, the extraction of which is "complicated and expensive"?
Am I correct in assuming successful extraction of hardware IDs would at the same time open new avenues of (offline) attacks?
How solid (read: future-proof) is security of this design, will the extraction of hardwareIDs always be deemed "too complicated and expensive"?