There are significant differences, both concrete and general, between the security provided by Confluence and a good password manager.
One specific problem is that Confluence doesn't encrypt data at rest. This means that someone with physical access to the disk can access the passwords. Even if you encrypt the disk, someone who gets access to the disk once the computer has booted (eg: via incorrectly configured remote disk access, or running a process on the server), can read the clear-text passwords.
Confluence also has many configuration settings that combine to grant or deny access to resources. Incorrectly setting these may lead to users unintentionally getting access to data.
Confluence also doesn't support common password manager features such as short authentication time-outs and masking passwords. The former is important because passwords are considered too critical to be trusted to the authentication of a computer or web portal such as Confluence. Masking passwords is important to prevent shoulder surfing which, in the case of a list of passwords in a table on a wiki page, seems a serious concern.
More generally, Confluence is a large and complex app that is written with the goal of sharing data. Password managers are very targeted apps that are written with the goal of securing data. As such, they are likely to have had more security-focused testing and code reviews, been written by more security-aware engineers, and to have been subjected to more security abuse by users. All of this leads to password managers being less likely to have vulnerabilities.