It depends. Securely configured DNScrypt servers and clients DO ensure zero DNS leakage. Dnscrypt encrypts DNS traffic. That means it cannot be viewed or successfully tampered with on the way to and from the downstream DNScrypt server. DNSCRYPT servers also remove any identifying data that could be sent upstream, and often offer "No forwarding to external/upstream DNS servers (recursive)"
From what I have gathered, DNSCrypt on its own may not be 100% secure. Security depends on the quality of the results obtained by your preferred DNSCRYPT server, given the server itself has not been compromised. Countering this drawback, DNSSEC validates the entire chain of command from upstream to downstream, and is implemented at the domain level, making it impossible to forge. Because this is a feature that must be enabled on a per-domain basis, and because very few domains have implemented DNSSEC, this makes DNSSEC largely redundant, until adoption increases. After months of use, I only found one obscure domain that was truly 'validated' by DNSSEC. DNSSEC overhead also noticeably increases latency. It is for these two reasons I stopped using it.
Given DNSCRYPT ensures zero DNS leakage, every query is encrypted and signed, technically you could use a dedicated DNSCRYPT/DNSSEC server for DNS query's, and a dedicated VPN for data traffic, breaking DNS and data into two separate streams. Splitting the stream could result in enhanced security; or possibly less, it totally depends on the VPN provider and the DNSCRYPT provider. Some DNSCRYPT servers use Google as an upstream and or companion (safebrowsing / adblock) server, as you will witness in DNS leak tests. So make sure you test and look before you assume anything. Bear in mind there will be more DNS logs accessible on your system(s) if logging is enabled for DNSCRYPT & any other Stub resolver, such as DNSMASQ. Logging is one of the primary factors VPN users ensure their providers are NOT doing. As for security benefits, using DNSCRYPT along side a VPN can enhance your security by giving you the option to implement your own blocklists to ensure malware domains and trackers are avoided over VPN.
Summing up, using VPN DNS puts attack surface squarely on their side, and on the integrity of your device, with potential DNS leaks; (adding the directive, block-outside-dns, to your openvpn configuration can fix this) Using DNScrypt brings more attack surface on your side but protects against DNS leaks, and host blocklists can reduce exposure to malware exponentially. Either way your records are as private as the integrity of your chosen providers, and your device, which is always the case anyway.
I am no expert; further insight by experts in this field would be greatly appreciated.