I maintain a departmental server hosted on a subdomain of my organizational network, as in
department.example.com use HTTPS, but run on completely different machines, use a different Certificate Authority, and use different key pairs.
department.example.com (the server which I am over) does not support SSLv2 or SSLv3; it only support TLSv1.0 and above. The version of OpenSSL on this machine is completely up to date.
example.com subdomain supports SSLv2, and uses a wildcard
*.example.com certificate. It uses an out of date version of OpenSSL.
When I ran my website through the DROWN attack vulnerability checker at https://drownattack.com/#check, it still told me that my website was vulnerable (to a man in the middle attack if I read it correctly). If the server key pairs on my subdomain
department.example.com are completely separate from the
example.com's key pair, my version of OpenSSL is up to date, and I don't support SSLv2, how could I still be vulnerable to the DROWN attack?
Can a "secured" subdomain be vulnerable because of the bad management of the
example.com server? If so, how does this work?