When you first connect to an SSH server that is not contained inside your known_hosts file your SSH client displays the fingerprint of the public key that the server gave. I found from this question here that as a client you are able to specify within ssh_config which one of the public key pairs from the hosts' /etc/ssh/ directory you would like.

From the ssh_config man page I found that the current defaults are as follows:


Only recently my SSH server has been sending me a ECDSA fingerprint instead of an RSA, but I was wondering which algorithm should I choose if it even matters?

This article claims that ECDSA is the old elliptic-curve DSA implementation that is known to have severe vulnerabilites Should I be using RSA or the newest ed25519 algorithm?



  • RSA is still recommended as a gold standard (strong, wide compatible)
  • ed25519 is good (independent of NIST, but not compatible with all old clients).

Server is usually providing more different host key types, so you are targeting for compatibility. The order of priority in the client config is from the stronger to more compatible ones.

Frankly, for you, as an end user, it should not matter. Some of the keys might have some security concerns, but none of them is considered completely broken with reasonable lengths, which could possibly cause man-in-the-middle attack or something similar.

The article mentions "severe vulnerabilites", but not saying anything specific. If it had such serve vulnerability, nobody would use it, support it, nor recommend it. Without any reference, it is pretty hard to comment on your concerns.

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  • Is this still the best answer? Sounds like ssh-rsa uses sha-1 which is no officially insecure: openssh.com/txt/release-8.2 – pinhead May 27 at 13:35
  • @pinhead yes. The RSA with SHA1 is no longer allowed in openssh.com/txt/release-8.3 but the RSA with SHA2 is there to live further (even for the price of more limited compatibility, but all implementations are catching up). – Jakuje May 27 at 14:02

Since the algorithms are in a state of flux, I find that using an ssh-audit tool (available on Github) (here's a more recent fork) to be extremely useful.

Example output of a current but secured SSH settings is given below:

# general
(gen) banner: SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_6.7p1 Debian-5+deb8u3
(gen) software: OpenSSH 6.7p1
(gen) compatibility: OpenSSH 6.5+, Dropbear SSH 2013.62+
(gen) compression: enabled (zlib@openssh.com)

# key exchange algorithms
(kex) curve25519-sha256@libssh.org          -- [info] available since OpenSSH 6.5, Dropbear SSH 2013.62
(kex) diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256  -- [warn] using custom size modulus (possibly weak)
                                            `- [info] available since OpenSSH 4.4

# host-key algorithms
(key) ssh-ed25519                           -- [info] available since OpenSSH 6.5
(key) ssh-rsa                               -- [info] available since OpenSSH 2.5.0, Dropbear SSH 0.28

# encryption algorithms (ciphers)
(enc) chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com         -- [info] available since OpenSSH 6.5
                                            `- [info] default cipher since OpenSSH 6.9.
(enc) aes256-gcm@openssh.com                -- [info] available since OpenSSH 6.2
(enc) aes128-gcm@openssh.com                -- [info] available since OpenSSH 6.2
(enc) aes256-ctr                            -- [info] available since OpenSSH 3.7, Dropbear SSH 0.52
(enc) aes192-ctr                            -- [info] available since OpenSSH 3.7
(enc) aes128-ctr                            -- [info] available since OpenSSH 3.7, Dropbear SSH 0.52

# message authentication code algorithms
(mac) hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com         -- [info] available since OpenSSH 6.2
(mac) hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com         -- [info] available since OpenSSH 6.2
(mac) umac-128-etm@openssh.com              -- [info] available since OpenSSH 6.2
(mac) hmac-sha1                             -- [warn] using encrypt-and-MAC mode
                                            `- [warn] using weak hashing algorithm
                                            `- [info] available since OpenSSH 2.1.0, Dropbear SSH 0.28

# algorithm recommendations (for OpenSSH 6.7)
(rec) -hmac-sha1                            -- mac algorithm to remove

Settings used for /etc/ssh/sshd_config:

KexAlgorithms curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
Ciphers chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes128-ctr
# Following MACs does not work on Mac OSX 10.10 or older
MACs hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1

Settings used for /etc/ssh/ssh_config:

HostKeyAlgorithms ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
KexAlgorithms curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
MACs hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1
Ciphers chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes128-ctr
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SSH supports several public key algorithms for authentication keys. These include:

  • rsa - an old algorithm based on the difficulty of factoring large numbers. A key size of at least 2048 bits is recommended for RSA; 4096 bits is better. RSA is getting old and significant advances are being made in factoring. Choosing a different algorithm may be advisable. It is quite possible the RSA algorithm will become practically breakable in the foreseeable future. All SSH clients support this algorithm.

  • dsa - an old US government Digital Signature Algorithm. It is based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms. A key size of 1024 would normally be used with it. DSA in its original form is no longer recommended.

  • ecdsa - a new Digital Signature Algorithm standarized by the US government, using elliptic curves. This is probably a good algorithm for current applications. Only three key sizes are supported: 256, 384, and 521 (sic!) bits. We would recommend always using it with 521 bits, since the keys are still small and probably more secure than the smaller keys (even though they should be safe as well). Most SSH clients now support this algorithm.

  • ed25519 - this is a new algorithm added in OpenSSH. Support for it in clients is not yet universal. Thus its use in general purpose applications may not yet be advisable.

see https://www.ssh.com/ssh/keygen/#sec-Choosing-an-Algorithm-and-Key-Size

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