As a result of following internet guides slightly too closely, my company's internal PKI now has an intermediate certificate with the serial number "10 00".
Comparing to other certificates, where the serial number is a fairly lengthy hex value, I'm left wondering whether I've created a sub-par cert.
Our Root CA is a simple offline Debian server, which produced the root certificate with OpenSSL. I then created an intermediate certificate authority (Windows Server 2012R2 bound to Active Directory), and created a CSR from that. Creating the certificate on the Root CA then produced this "10 00" certificate, which is now distributed throughout Active Directory.
As this certificate belongs to the Issuing CA, the serial number of the certificates it produces are unpredictable. It's also the only certificate from the RootCA that will have such a droll serial number; any subsequent certificates signed by our Root will have more lengthy serial numbers.
Have I introduced any vulnerabilities or insufficiencies into our PKI with this serial number? Is it worth the time to pull it out of the AD infrastructure and start over?
EDIT: The certificates in question are RSA-4096, using SHA256.