In order to minimize potentially compromised software from reading what I'm writing in Veracrypt I want to use the software inside an encrypted guest OS with no Internet, specifically Ubuntu 16.04. Does this minimize the chances any piece of software in the host OS will compromise TrueCrypt?


Not in any way. Host software (eg. kernel rootkit) still has access to everything ie. your encryption keys inside VM's RAM.

Usually you use virtualization to protect the host against hostile code, so that the code running inside the VM can't harm the host (and there are still loopholes). There is no way to protect a VM against the host.

  • 1
    While that's true and your solution doesn't minimize the danger, it does add a layer of protection. Virtualbox, AFAIK, runs it's own kernel, which means that while it's easy to access the VM's RAM from the host, I doubt that most malware would know how to scan a VM's RAM or kernel process table for Veracrypt, because there's an additional layer of indirection between software that expects to find veracrypt running on the same host, possibly by looking at /proc/, and software that can reach into a vm's /proc. Still, I'd agree with filo to not count on this scheme to protect me. – Out of Band Feb 10 '17 at 11:02
  • Yes - you can treat the VM as an obfuscation layer. – filo Feb 10 '17 at 11:04

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