The problem with simply dogpiling one encryption algorithm on top of another and believing that everything will somehow be "more secure" is that if you haven't studied the algorithms in detail, you won't have a full understanding of their weaknesses, or enough understanding of the side effects of this operation. That's not intended as an insult, I'm simply inferring from the question that you're not a cryptanalyst, and you haven't done these studies.
Have a look at Triple DES. It was designed as a replacement for DES once it was recognized that DES was too weak to withstand ever-improving brute force attacks. DES has 8 byte keys, so logically since DES should withstand a brute force attack of 2^64, Double DES should withstand an attack of 2^128. So why use Triple DES and not just use Double DES? It turns out the estimate of strength is not even close to correct.
First, DES discards the top bit of each key byte, so DES has a key size of only 56 bits -- 55 bits once you factor out XOR reflection. An attacker can store the output of a brute force attack on the first instance of DES, then attack the second instance matching any of the stored outputs, creating a meet-in-the-middle attack. This results in an attack of 2^55 + 2^55, which is 2^56. All that work to run DES twice yields a one bit of improvement in strength.
So Triple DES obviously doesn't withstand an attack of 2^192. 3DES does improve this to 2^111 bits of strength, which is still plenty strong, but it's a far distance from the implied strength of 2^192.
It is not obvious that encrypting the output of one pass through DES with another pass is easily broken, yet cryptographers figured that out. Can you offer strong evidence that your two-layer encryption isn't similarly flawed?
Crypto is hard because the random-looking bytes coming out of an encryption algorithm look very much like they've been successfully scrambled. But there isn't an attribute you can test for to know if the encryption is effective or if it's breakable.
So the advice generally given is "do not invent your own crypto algorithms". Going along with that, it is not recommended to invent your own protocols, either; if you must, you have a lot of work to do to prove they're secure.