On 2018-04-23, the ReSwitched team publicly released their exploit. The FAQ you linked has not been updated since (as of the writing of this post). A summary of the exploit is available in the vulnerability disclosure report:
The USB software stack provided inside the boot instruction rom (IROM/bootROM) contains a copy
operation whose length can be controlled by an attacker. By carefully constructing a USB control
request, an attacker can leverage this vulnerability to copy the contents of an attacker-controlled
buffer over the active execution stack, gaining control of the Boot and Power Management processor
(BPMP) before any lock-outs or privilege reductions occur. This execution can then be used to
exfiltrate secrets and to load arbitrary code onto the main CPU Complex (CCPLEX) "application
processors" at the highest possible level of privilege (typically as the TrustZone Secure Monitor at
PL3/EL3).
The report also contains specific details of the exploit. As the report states, it has been known by multiple entities for some time. More details relevant for end users are availailable in the Q&É.