As per the paper, you provided page 12 features a section titled "Potential Countermeasures" (Also mentioned by Steffen) - this section of the paper states what they require to prevent such attacks and they clearly point out how it can be done.
Even though the LTE Authentication
and Key Agreement (AKA) is formally proven secure
, this attack is still possible due to the lack of
integrity protection of user plane data.
While different suitable schemes exist like AES-GCM
(AES-Galois/Counter Mode), we focus on the MAC-then-Encrypt scheme
that is already used for the integrity protection of the control
plane. We assume that this scheme has the highest potential for being
adopted in the specification - Breaking LTE on L2
MAC-then-Encrypt is a method whereby you compute the MAC (Message Authentication Code) on the plaintext, append it to the data then encrypt hence the term "MAC-then-Encrypt". If you want more details on this see: Should we MAC-then-encrypt or encrypt-then-MAC?