[new answer based on improved understanding of question based on OP comments to first, now deleted, answer]
Is there any way for my website to tell a browser to disallow a
substitute MITM certificate like those used by corporate proxy
There are, although they are solutions designed to prevent the damage caused by certificates that were incorrectly issued to malicious parties by a CA. Two such solutions are HPKP and DANE. However, these are waning in support as other, different solutions (which don't help your use case) come into play.
HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) involves the server communicating which certificates are valid to the browser within the HTTP headers. It has been deprecated, however, "because of its complexity and dangerous side-effects." But it's worth noting particularly because, pertinent to your question,
Most browsers disable pinning for certificate chains with private root
certificates to enable various corporate content inspection
scanners and web debugging tools (such as mitmproxy or Fiddler).
The RFC 7469 standard recommends disabling pinning violation reports
for "user-defined" root certificates, where it is "acceptable" for the
browser to disable pin validation.
In other words - there are hooks to permit Corporate MITM in HPKP, as well.
DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) does something similar, placing information about acceptable certificates into DNS entries. It doesn't appear to have very good browser support, however, and if the Corporate Overlords are imposing MITM at the proxy, they're also capable of blackholing the necessary DNS queries.
Newer solutions to the problem of "bogus" certificates have shifted away from the browser, and as such aren't useful for your purposes. DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) allows server admins to publish a DNS record identifying the correct CA they use; however, this is used by other CAs as a check to avoid malicious requests for certificates from someone other than the domain owner. Browsers do not use this record to verify anything.
Likewise, Certificate Transparency (CT) requires CAs to publish the certificates they've issued, allowing subjects and third parties to look for malicious certificates. However, this isn't something browsers use, either.