It shouldn't be possible to "brute-force" possibilities unless you provide an oracle for an attacker to utilize.
An oracle in this case allows the attacker to feed as much chosen plaintext as they'd like into your encryptor, and receive encrypted output to check against.
If this is the case, you need to safeguard your data, preferably by setting an Initialization Vector for a block cipher mode like CBC or CTR (use GCM if possible), and making it so that the IV is chosen by the oracle (and not by the attacker).
Though you should really be doing this anyway.
I don't think the approach of padding your blocks with random data would be very effective in an attack against an oracle.
It could possibly mitigate an attack in the extreme edge case of only having 1 block of encrypted data, but it wouldn't be nearly as effective as just properly setting an Initialization Vector.
tl;dr No, unless there's an oracle for an attacker to exploit. If there is, make sure you're setting the initialization vector (oracle-side).