Chrome on Windows stores both passwords and cookies using Windows' DPAPI, a developer-friendly cryptosystem that uses an encryption key protected by your Windows password. Without the DPAPI key (directly, or indirectly by just logging into the account), an attacker cannot extract any secrets from Chrome. With that said, don't forget that stolen cookies are also a threat, unless you signed out of all your accounts before leaving.
The security of DPAPI is primarily dependent on the security of your Windows password. If the password is very good - too long / random to be brute-forced even considering Windows' low-quality password hashing code - then you're probably fine against that particular attack. If the password is amenable to brute force then an attacker can either just log into your Windows account or extract your DPAPI key and DPAPI-protected data and, with some effort, extract your secrets that way.
Depending on the state you left your computer in before the disk was stolen and the security settings in the OS, there may be sensitive data in the pagefile and/or hiberfile. This could include any data that a program (such as Chrome or Windows itself) had in memory, including passwords, cookies, encryption keys, and potentially even things like your LastPass password vault. Extracting that data is beyond a typical thief - it's not structured for easy retrieval, and may well be fragmentary - but software exists or could be written to do it. A typical thief is also unlikely to break into an office and steal only a hard disk; at a minimum I would expect they're going to be looking for something like financial data, source code or other trade secrets, and credentials or session tokens.
This all assumes you weren't using encrypted drives. A stolen disk/SSD encrypted with BitLocker or VeraCrypt or similar has no value to an attacker beyond whatever they can get for fencing the hardware. If you were using full-volume encryption, changing your passwords was probably a good idea anyhow but the risk was minimal if your encryption was configured reasonably well (not simply limited to a brute-force-susceptible password, for example).
I certainly hope your current disk is encrypted. BitLocker has been available in Windows since Vista, and with Win10 Pro (or Enterprise) it is very easy to use if your PC has a TPM (hardware security chip) and entirely possible even without one (change a setting to not require the TPM, and set up a system volume passphrase and/or require a key that's stored on a flashdrive you only insert when booting up). Full-volume encryption such as BitLocker is a much more comprehensive protection against the theft of data (at rest, such as on a stolen disk) than any per-application or per-file security.
