If you encrypt the disk from the start, when you first start using it, then this isn't a problem. All data you write is encrypted and remapped sectors just lead to encrypted data being remanent on the over-provisioned area. Since the data is encrypted, you can't do anything with it even if you recover it using direct flash reads on a disassembled SSD.
Furthermore, identifying where that data came from in the encrypted stream is particularly difficult, and since most FDE block cipher modes (e.g. XTS) include the sector number (or some other position value) as part of the initialisation vector it becomes exceedingly difficult to recover plaintext from those remanent sectors even if you are in possession of the FDE master key.
On top of that, most SSDs implement the ATA Secure Erase feature. This feature allows you to send a single command to safely erase the disk without needing to write over every sector. Overwriting sectors is costly as flash cells have limited write cycles. This feature works by transparently encrypting all sectors using a randomly generated key which is stored in the disk controller's nonvolatile memory. When you run the ATA Secure Erase command, the disk controller discards the old key and generates a new one. This instantly makes all data on the disk unreadable. As a side-effect, all over-provisioned areas are also encrypted this way, meaning that even without using your own FDE on the SSD the over-provisioned areas are still encrypted and difficult to recover even if you extract the Secure Erase master key from the controller's nonvolatile memory. If you later do a Secure Erase command, the overprovisioned areas become unreadable too.