You should not do this, but if you must, use CBC.
GCM is like CTR mode, but with an authentication tag built into it. Unfortunately, if the nonce (IV) is reused, an attacker can recover the key used for authentication, making the authentication tag all but useless. Now you're basically using CTR mode, and CTR mode does not deal well with nonce reuse. An attacker can recover the XOR of any plaintexts encrypted with the same nonce.
With CBC mode each plaintext block is XORed with the previous ciphertext block, but the first plaintext block is instead XORed with the IV. When an IV is reused, an attacker can tell if the plaintexts share a prefix with a length divisible by the block size (ie you can tell if there is a 16 byte, 32 byte, etc prefix).
Edit: As Xander points out, since GCM's authentication tag is broken when a nonce is reused, this answers your question.