I was discussing with someone ways to prevent data disclosure from a compromised admin account on a database server. The other person proposed encrypting the data at rest within the database. It sounds like a good idea, but I wasn't sure if that would protect the data in this scenario.
My thinking is if the attacker has an admin account, they'll also have the ability to access the encryption key. In a typical configuration, would this be the case? Could the system be engineered so that it wouldn't, while still being practical to administer and use? I could see having the admin provide the key when they log in, but I am ignorant on the security implications of that...
My threat model is as follows: A legitimate admin account's username and password is compromised. Our attacker uses that account to log in remotely and download the database. I understand MFA and other access controls would protect here, but assume they've failed or otherwise been circumvented. I'm merely curious of encryption's effect here.
Now I realize this would definitely come down to implementation specific details, however I am not super familiar with database administration, so I'm struggling to provide a detailed setup for a hypothetical system.