If there are places on a laptop malicious programs can leave elements, hooks, backdoors etc, in locations such as BIOS, device controllers, firmware etc - what confidence can one have in wiping the disk and installing a fresh OS image.

If I were to first use data destruction software to overwrite every individually addressable location on the hard disk, before secondly installing a freshly downloaded Windows image, this presumably isn’t much of a solution.

Surely, binning and buying a replacement is the only option? (Which would be dire, since the machine is new.)


4 Answers 4


You must do risk management. How likely it is that you and your laptop have been personally targeted? The vast majority of persistent malware operates entirely in software, and formatting the disk is more than enough to remove all traces of it. Sophisticated, firmware-resident malware is extremely rare and unlikely to be a threat unless you have particular reason to think that you are at risk. It is possible to check for firmware-level malware, but it requires a good understanding of common x86 architecture, and access to hardware to read from the flash chips. At a minimum, you'd need SPI readers for the BIOS/UEFI, and JTAG probes for the hard drive firmware and related.

If you don't have any reason to think you're being targeted, just format and re-install.

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    Sophisticated, firmware-resident malware is extremely rare Unless (mentioned just for completeness) you consider things like Intel ME to fit inside the category, in which case it's extremely common. Commented May 23, 2019 at 7:23
  • 9
    @FedericoPoloni The CSME is definitely an ugly black box, but I wouldn't quite consider it malware. It needs to have AMT modules loaded (which is only true for some server hardware) and be provisioned for remote access before it's able to do anything harmful like remotely controlling a system.
    – forest
    Commented May 23, 2019 at 7:28
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    The Intel Management Engine always runs as long as the motherboard is receiving power, even when the computer is turned off. System administrators can use it to turn the computer on and off, and they can login remotely into the computer regardless of whether or not an operating system is installed. en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Management_Engine Commented May 23, 2019 at 12:17
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    @Pedro all of that is true, but only after going through the initial firmware setup to set a password, configure networking, and enable the service. Out of the box it does nothing. Initial provisioning requires physical access.
    – barbecue
    Commented May 23, 2019 at 19:30
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    If you have been personally targeted, buying new hardware is no assurance of getting unaltered hardware unless you have good control over the supply chain since someone could install a backdoor before you have possession of the hardware.
    – Johnny
    Commented May 24, 2019 at 20:21

While you are right to note some of the more esoteric attack vectors, you need to remember that they are not typically the kind of things a rogue employee or corporate competitor would utilize.

I would (pessimistically) suggest that if your attackers are capable of undetectable custom BIOS and controller mods, then replacing the hardware isn't likely to be a sure-fire remedy anyway. They got to you once, and they are a powerful adversary, so it doesn't stand to reason they don't have other compromises or aren't capable of a repeat "visit". Being pro-active is great, but be realistic as well, and appreciate the capabilities of your threats.


If you flash your BIOS with the latest/best copy you can find at the manufacturer's site, wipe and reformat your hard drive, re-install/upgrade all the device drivers (which you'd normally have to do anyway), there's little chance of anything going wrong.

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    If you have an already compromised BIOS, you can't just flash a new BIOS via software. You have to use an SPI programmer and directly connect it to the chip that holds the firmware in flash/EEPROM.
    – forest
    Commented May 24, 2019 at 2:05
  • @forest how about this procedure? techwalla.com/articles/removing-bios-virus do you think that wouldn't work for some reason? Commented May 24, 2019 at 20:50
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    @GeorgeM in that case, you're using a potentially corrupted BIOS to boot the system in order to clean it. If it needs to be flashed because you don't trust that it hasn't been compromised, you can't use it as part of your restoration procedure. For example, it could just put the same compromise back in the newly flashed BIOS.
    – Xcali
    Commented May 24, 2019 at 21:19
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    @GeorgeM As far as I can tell, flashing the BIOS is an activity performed by the BIOS itself. An infected BIOS might have a modified flashing routine that pretends to perform the flash but really does nothing, or alternatively performs the flash and then reinstalls the compromise on the new BIOS. Using an SPI programmer would be the only way to bypass that compromised firmware layer, and write the new BIOS directly to the chip. Commented May 24, 2019 at 23:52
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    @DarthFennec It's not that it's performed by the BIOS, but the BIOS does have control over the operating system which performs it. Compromised firmware implies a compromised OS, so trying to flash clean firmware from within that compromised OS is futile.
    – forest
    Commented May 25, 2019 at 3:18

The main example I can find is from 2011 called Trojan.Mebromi. Symantec wrote up a bunch on this and similar viruses in 2011.

I do find one forum post from Jan 2019 where someone hard an MBR infection. It sure didn't hide itself and want to stay persistent. It's objective seems to have been destruction.

If something is sophisticated enough to infect your hardware in the way you mention, keep itself quietly persistent without any symptoms, I don't think you'll be patient zero! It will be all over the news!

I run Malwarebytes on my MacBookPro regularly just to make sure nothing has found its ware onto my system.

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    MBR is not part of the hardware, it's the first sector of the drive. dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/infected bs=512 count=1 will wipe the MBR with zeroes.
    – user163495
    Commented May 24, 2019 at 8:41

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