It depends on your threat model. CBC is more malleable, but XTS leaks more information.
CBC-ESSIV (and plain CBC, which is additionally vulnerable to the watermarking attacks that ESSIV prevents) is vulnerable to malleability attacks where an attacker can change the ciphertext in a way that modifies resulting plaintext predictably, even if they don't have access to the key. XTS is not nearly as vulnerable, although it is still partially malleable, allowing an attacker to randomize plaintext with 16 byte granularity. Neither XTS nor CBC-ESSIV provide true integrity like an authenticated mode can.
XTS mode is not without its problems, though. In terms of information leakage, XTS is actually worse than any CBC mode. If an attacker can view the ciphertext on your disk in between changes, they can detect which individual blocks changed and which did not change. CBC modes do not leak as much information, since a single changed 16 byte block also changes all subsequent blocks in that 512 or 4096 byte sector. This is explained very well in Squeamish Ossifrage's answer (though I disagree that there is no advantage to XTS and no reason to use it; some threat models may call for it over CBC).
Overall, if your adversary might modify the encrypted contents of your disk and give it back to you without your knowledge, then XTS is more secure than CBC-ESSIV. If, on the other hand, your adversary may be able to see changes to the encrypted volume over time, then XTS is less secure.
The Linux kernel does not support it at the time of this answer, but there is another mode called EME2 which is a wide-block mode. It requires two passes over the plaintext so it is half as performant as most other modes, but it leaks very little information and is not nearly as malleable. Wide-block modes act on the entire sector, so changing a single bit in the entire sector will randomize the entire sector.