Let's build a scene: I'm working on my laptop in the library, and while I'm gone to the toilet for 5 minutes, someone disassembled my laptop and took the hard drive. I encrypted it with VeraCrypt, so I assume it's save. Now, I build some PC's in the past, and a simple step involved in that process is connecting the hard drive or SSD to the motherboard. I was wondering this: What's the exact thing that prevents the thief from connecting my HDD to his motherboard and seeing the contents of it in Windows Explorer? (Or any other way)
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1They don't have your keys.– user163495Dec 21, 2019 at 10:07
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@MechMK1 yes but I don't have to type in the keys everytime– Ömer Enes ÖzmenDec 21, 2019 at 10:41
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They're in your TPM– user163495Dec 21, 2019 at 10:43
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1@MechMK1 The TPM doesn't store keys. It has its own internal "sealing" key which encrypts, or seals, a blob that you pass to it. It's your job to store the encrypted blob.– forestDec 21, 2019 at 11:18
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1@MechMK1 Also, VeraCrypt does not use the TPM.– forestDec 21, 2019 at 11:25
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1 Answer
Disk encryption provides data-at-rest security. That is, the data is only secure if your computer is fully powered down (or the attacker can't or doesn't know how to perform attacks against a live system). In such a case, the reason drive encryption is safe is that only you know your password. This password is used to derive an encryption key. The drive contents can be downloaded, but they would appear to be gibberish to anyone who does not possess the correct key.
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1@kelalaka A cold boot attack can be performed in seconds, depending on how it is performed.– forestDec 23, 2019 at 9:13