You are comparing apples with oranges.
Tor makes standard only those parameters that can be the same without any disadvantages to the user. For instance, window size or agent string. But some parameters like result of drawing something on canvas cannot be done standard. If you draw things in the same way everywhere, the web page can look unreadable.
What Brave and many FireFox and Chrome extensions do, is adding some noise to such data like drawing on canvas. As long as changes remain small and not perceivable, users don't complain about the negative effects of such noise. But this is also a limitation of such protection method. Because making sure the noise is not perceivable means that some statistical parameters must remain in a limited range. This means that despite some information provided by canvas is lost, it remains still not null and can still be used to compute a fingerprint.
What of these methods is more effective depends on particular fingerprinting algorithm. If algorithm uses canvas fingerprint blindly, believing it gets say 15 bits, then actually we should subtract these bits because they will be different each time. Thus Brave approach would be more effective.
But if some site uses another fingerprinting, calculates some statistical values (some average values, deviations, etc.), then in general it gets less bits of information, let say 5 bits instead of 15. But it remains resistant to small noise added. Thus this fingerprint will be the same for Brave and for Tor, where as Tor has some other parameters standardized. In such case Tor will be more effective.
There is no simple answer.
We should consider also the other side: the web site that computes your fingerprint. The meaning of effective depends a lot depends on many factors:
- ... on the purpose of fingerprinting: may be the web site doesn't have any interest in particular persons, but just wants to have to measure some metrics about its users; as long as they get statistics with acceptable precision, they will not invest much budget into development of very complex fingerprinting. Other web sites for their needs will develop more complex algorithms so that both Tor and Brave are fingerprintable
- ... on the skills of developers designing and implementing fingerprinting for particular web site: in one case Tor and Brave can both be effective, in other case the countermeasures of the both can be insufficient
- ... on the budget available: if a web site can afford sufficient budget for research, for design of complex algorithm, for its implementation in a good quality, for its maintenance, then both Tor and Brave can be too weak to prevent precise fingerprinting
And this is of course an arms race: after one side found a countermeasure, the other will work to make it ineffective.
In general, I think fingerprinting is in the most cases unavoidable as long as the code you download from web sites is allowed to communicate with these web sites.
That's why I find it very naive, that there is a legal requirements in the last years to inform users about cookies used. Fingerprinting requires more resources to keep data and to correlate across different web sites, but it does its job. One can delete cookies in the browser or user ad blocker. But preventing unique fingerprints is much more complex.