The trust stores of major browsers (at least: Chrome, Firefox, Safari, Edge and Brave) at all cost avoid certificate authorities which could potentially be controlled by governments.
There once was an attempt by the government of Kazakhstan to add their official root certificate to the trust chains. It ultimately failed exactly due to the trust issues. Nowadays, chances even for a private company from a country with a heavy governmental influence on the economy (like Kazakhstan or Russia) to successfully commit their certificate to the public trust stores are basically nil.
Moreover, more than once Mozilla and other vendors explicitly banned (i.e. you cannot accept it on a page even if you want to) even the untrusted root certificate issued by Kazakhstan for MITM attacks. So even if, say, the potentially evil government of Valencia, Spain (for your information, their own root certificate is now present in your trust store — see) decides to eavesdrop on its users, such an attempt would cause the exclusion of their certificate from browsers, and pretty quickly.
Then it all comes down to risk modelling. Probably the governments would only risk the exclusion of their local certificate authorities if the stakes are high, e.g. they are chasing a notorious terrorist or a famous dissident. However, such people would probably use stronger privacy protection methods anyway.