Only using SPF, DKIM and DMARC does not protect you from spoofing addresses.
SPF supports "fail" and "soft fail". Some mail providers are using "soft fail" because it is like a debugging flag, which means "the sender is not valid, but i will accept it"
If you want to stop spoofing, you should use "fail" in your spf record. If you import the rules from your provider, you can override the qualifier. Only the last qualifier is important.
With SPF, the attacker should not able to use a different server. If you are in a hosted environment, another user can spoof your address, if the server does not check, if the user is allowed to use the mail address.
In 2020, Google was affected by such a vulnerability: https://ezh.es/blog/2020/08/the-confused-mailman-sending-spf-and-dmarc-passing-mail-as-any-gmail-or-g-suite-customer/
Using DKIM and DMARC, the server signs your email and the recipient can be sure, that the email was sent from a valid server and the user was allowed to send emails with this address.
RFC-7489 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7489) in chapter 3.1 is the behavior of DMARC and the "From:" field defiend.
Thus, this field is the one used by end users to identify the source
of the message and therefore is a prime target for abuse. Many
high-profile email sources, such as email service providers, require
that the sending agent have authenticated before email can be
generated. Thus, for these mailboxes, the mechanism described in this
document provides recipient end users with strong evidence that the
message was indeed originated by the agent they associate with that
mailbox, if the end user knows that these various protections have
This means, if you are using SPF, DMARC and DKIM, the sender field "From:" is trusted.
The DKIM signature is not like S/MIME or PGP, it is a server signature, which only protects the headers and not the body of the mail..