SIM swap occurs where the scammer uses phished information about you to request a SIM card replacement from your cell phone carrier, by tricking them into believing that it is you who is making the request for a SIM card replacement by passing their security questions on the phone based on the biometric data they phished about you.

Once they have that duplicate of your SIM card, they can receive access codes to your banking and cryptocurrency accounts, because all of this is linked to your phone number (the SIM card).

How can anyone possibly protect themselves against this sort of attack? Rarely does anyone have a second phone number, so whatever account you based on your sole number, means they instantly have backdoor access (by fooling your service providers using phished information about you, orally over the phone and by online forms)

  • 14
    Google Authenticator codes require access to a shared secret, so a sim swap will not compromise it
    – nobody
    Commented Feb 11, 2021 at 14:27
  • 4
    one good way is to call your cell-phone service provider and ask them to require a PIN# to change your SIM. (After you get your PIN, try to social engineer them... be sure they require you to give them the PIN... so insist that you lost the PIN and see where it goes from there.) Commented Feb 11, 2021 at 18:39
  • Another thing you might do is use Google Voice not tied to a cell phone for all your 2Factor SMSing. (A little less secure in some ways... ) Commented Feb 11, 2021 at 18:45
  • 2
    @pcalkins is what you typed a thought experiment or an actual procedure that you think will work? Imagine the carrier helpdesk not being equipped for what you illustrate, and going "You have to type your pin into your phone, we don't know it".
    – CodeCaster
    Commented Feb 12, 2021 at 12:47
  • @OP maybe you meant "biographical" data than "biometric". I'm already scared that my Government may own my biometrics, I would never have business with a private company messing with my biometrics Commented Feb 12, 2021 at 16:41

6 Answers 6


You don't use SMS for a second factor.

SMS is not secure by any means. The text is on clear, the traffic is on clear, and it's trivially easy to get a new SIM by pretending to be the victim. I once got my phone stolen and got myself a new SIM just by walking to the telco booth and telling my name and the phone number.

Google Authenticator is offline. It does not depend on the SIM in any way. You can even calculate the OTP token using PHP/Python/Perl/Javascript, all offline. You would even be able to do it with a calculator that lets you run programs on it.

  • 4
    You could probably even do it with a dumb calculator if you can type fast enough
    – Hobbamok
    Commented Feb 12, 2021 at 8:54
  • 15
    It’s worth pointing out that if you as a user manage things correctly, SMS-based 2FA is still technically better than no 2FA at all. as It still raises the bar a little for targeted attacks, and also provides some measure of protection against bulk untargeted attacks. Yes, you should almost always prefer TOTP or U2F, but it’s still better than nothing. Commented Feb 12, 2021 at 13:01
  • 11
    @AustinHemmelgarn The problem is, that most sites start to allow SMS as account recovery option once they got your number.
    – allo
    Commented Feb 12, 2021 at 14:59
  • 5
    I was unable to convince my bank that neither my phone number nor SMS nor email were acceptable two-factor methods. And I'm convinced that they didn't do it right and would accept a password reset using one of those so it's really only one factor.
    – Joshua
    Commented Feb 12, 2021 at 16:45
  • 12
    You don't use SMS for a second factor You may want to have a chat with my banks. All of them use SMS and are really proud of their security. But this is in France, the country of Middle Age Banking.
    – WoJ
    Commented Feb 12, 2021 at 17:53

One of the main vulnerabilities that leads to SIM-swapping is from social engineering attacks. If you must use SMS 2FA, one approach is to use a Google Voice number. Since Google Voice has minimal customer support, there's little opportunity to perform a social engineering attack.

It's not a good solution, and, as other answers said, skipping SMS 2FA is best. However, this may be better than nothing if you must use SMS 2FA.

  • 4
    +1 Sadly Google Voice doesn't seem to be available outside of the US.
    – gd1
    Commented Feb 14, 2021 at 12:01

For serious 2FA authentication systems, the phone is only the second factor. That means that to impersonate its victim, the attacker should also guess the primary factor (the password).

What is really bad is that some authentication systems, including some banks ones, accept the phone holding the second factor of authentication as the primary password recuperation tool. And this clearly breaks into pieces the 2FA security. In the event that this happens, I think that the responsability of the bank should be involved: they force their client to use a broken weak authentication system. But IANAL and have no idea if any legal action about this has ever occured in any country...

  • -1, doesn't answer the question which was "How to protect against SIM swap scammers?". As a side note, the fact that there is a 1st factor has no relevance to methods of protecting the 2nd factor. If your plan is "I don't need to worry about the 2nd factor being insecure because I have a 1st factor", then you're missing the whole point of 2FA. Commented Feb 12, 2021 at 13:34
  • -1 Not an answer to the question.
    – gd1
    Commented Feb 14, 2021 at 16:03

Buy a cheap old Nokia phone with a few different SIM cards. Only use one number for each online account. Never share these numbers with anyone. Keep the phone off in a draw.

Why? If people do not know the number, they cannot do a SIM swap. If they can get into the database belonging to insert company name here they likely already have everything they need to drain your account.

Also, this might sound weird, but it is often easier to SIM swap when the user has verified the SIM with an ID document, because then it can be done over the phone as opposed to the scammer going into the carrier's phone shop.

  • 3
    +1 Rather than taking the floor and grandstanding by repeating ad nauseam that SMS is insecure and we have no bulletproof defense against SIM swap attacks, this answer provides a viable mitigation strategy. How refreshing.
    – gd1
    Commented Feb 14, 2021 at 3:10
  • SIM Swapping's primary weakness is it is so easy to attack it, so assume your public facing number is already compromised and never 2FA with it. If nobody knows your number, they can't SIM Swap it.
    – Nelson
    Commented Feb 14, 2021 at 14:55
  • @Nelson Furthermore, if you do not verify the number with identity documents it is much harder, as the scammer often has to visit a shop to do the SIM swap. Most scammers will not risk being seen on camera, or having a suspicious shop keeper stop them.
    – questioner
    Commented Feb 15, 2021 at 2:17
  • Do you have to have an active account with some carrier for this "old Nokia phone" method to work? I have a number of older, working phones, whose SIMs were previously associated with my phone number. Can you link to a site that describes how to use a set-up like this to get SMS texts?
    – jrw32982
    Commented Feb 15, 2021 at 19:50
  • @jrw32982 Unless things are different where you live - you simply just go to a shop, get an unregistered SIM card for £1, and buy an old Nokia phone for £10. Put the SIM into the Nokia phone, and you now have a working number.
    – questioner
    Commented Feb 16, 2021 at 22:00

First, the symptom of a SIM swap is that you lose signal on your phone. Using a primary number rather than a secondary, i.e., one your mum will usually call you on instead of a SIM card you put in the drawer, is the best way to detect it earlier and act earlier. You'll detect something's wrong and try to get in contact with your provider to discover evil. And do your best to gain ownership back.

You don't protect yourself: providers do

It's not up to you, but all about the education of your service provider not to use SMS as the only recovery factor.

If your service provider using SMS recovery holds information or assets (e.g. cryptocurrency, information that may permanently damage your personal reputation like very personal media) that are totally unrecoverable after incident, then you should just change provider; you can't protect yourself. Even if you write to customer service, they may bounce you on excuse of paranoia (reason is budget).

Also depending on your jurisdiction, and the environment your service is operating in, you have a few more chances to protect not from SIM swap, but from consequences.

Bank example: if your bank operates under PSD2 (e.g., Europe) and they use SMS as the only recovery factor, by the time you report the incident to your provider and/or police, you are protecting yourself from fraudulent trades until you can call the bank and shout "stop everything! somebody stole my number!". The laws, your mileage may vary, according to jurisdiction, can add a layer of protection so that you could get your money back.

As a final note, many (four+) large banks of my knowledge are aware of SMS weakness and use it as first and not only recovery factor. The second factor are.... security questions!

SIM swap is matter of mobile operators, not customers

Also remember that the SIM swap is a matter of people who work at the mobile operator, so you can't really make the difference. In order for someone to obtain a SIM card fast, one should go to a physical retailer, with either counterfeit ID or they must really really really really look like you for identification.

If I call your mobile operator and say "Hello, this is J. Doe, I was born on 01/01/1990 in Dallas, could you mail a replacement SIM to Evergreen Terrace?" without any additional form of recognition, then that's your carrier's fault!

  • "then that's your carrier's fault!" -- Right, I didn't expect there might be carriers that would do that, except perhaps as an accommodation against COVID-19. If one wishes to protect themselves against that, I guess they could check if their carrier is vulnerable by requesting such a SIM replacement for themselves, with the idea of switching carriers if they are.
    – JoL
    Commented Feb 12, 2021 at 17:32
  • 2
    Switching carriers to what? They all are vulnerable for that.
    – Aganju
    Commented Feb 12, 2021 at 18:34
  • 4
    My carrier let me get a new SIM by walking by, telling that my phone was stolen, and giving my full name and number. No ID necessary, absolutely no questions asked. They got a new SIM from the drawer, entered its ID on the computer, and in 3 minutes I had my number back, and was worried on how easy it would be to me to steal the SIM of anyone from the same operator.
    – ThoriumBR
    Commented Feb 12, 2021 at 19:07

Modern landline phones can receive SMS messages. Or as a fallback, the provider is turning it into a text-to-speech phone call, at least here in Germany. It worked so far with every service I tried.

  • This works really well because most carriers require you to call from the number that you want to transfer, and the only way that someone could do that is by breaking into your house, which makes it massively more difficult
    – B-K
    Commented Feb 13, 2021 at 12:10
  • @BobKerman "only […] by breaking into your house" … this is less true for SIP (VoIP telephony), where I only need credentials and internet access to make outgoing calls, and caller ID can be forged, too. Commented Feb 14, 2021 at 14:19
  • This may work during a lockdown, but in general most people have to receive SMS OTPs (for those services which, unfortunately, don't offer anything better - usually banks) outside of their dwellings as well.
    – gd1
    Commented Feb 15, 2021 at 22:47
  • I used my work phone number, which nowadays gets redirected to my home office.
    – Bob
    Commented Feb 15, 2021 at 23:29
  • I'd say this solution presents serious logistical challenges, given that you barely managed to make it work in two physical locations at once, and only by relying on your employer's infrastructure. Let's hope their IT department don't screw with your call redirection setup the next time they update their SIP server over the weekend.
    – gd1
    Commented Feb 16, 2021 at 8:56

You must log in to answer this question.

Not the answer you're looking for? Browse other questions tagged .