- A VERY motivated attacker,
- A large entropy password, as in 256bits¹ hashed in bcrypt (with recommended cost factor of 12), and
- Attacker knowledge of everything he might need (except the password): hash, salt, cost, etc [AFAIK those are included in the bcrypt hash]
Is it safe to assume that an exposed bcrypt hash is secure and therefore the attacker won't be able to access the password (or find a collision) any time soon? If the answers is "depends" you are free to make assumptions, please explain why though :)
I did previous research on the topic, and it seems that the answer is YES, but I didn't actually found that in a clear statement. There is a similar question to mine here but IT'S NOT A DUPLICATE, as the answers address implementation/designs flaws and not the security of the hashes. I also found this and it made me question the security of the hashes when he mentions he "side-step the brute-forcing process", although it isn't clear if it's even related to the hash.
1: Just to be sure, I'm calculating entropy as log2(R^L) where R = 62 (Alphanumeric with uppercase) and L = 43 (as in number of characters).
2: I haven't been pwned or anything, I just want to get a clear understanding if it's safe to assume this or if there is something I might be missing.