I came across this issue when we implemented a new security solution. Said solution has its own root CA certificate and will create certificates for HTTPS web pages "on the fly". Each HTTPS page you visit now has an "instant" certificate that is issued by the security solution's CA and not its original certificate.
What you now basically do is communicate with the security solution, which acts as a proxy. It "breaks open" TLS traffic, inspects it, and in turn (re-)establishes an encrypted connection to the target web server.
Now, what if it wasn't a security solution, but a malicious actor who did this? This would be a very easy and convenient way to perform man-in-the-middle attacks. Is the installation of a CA certificate in the browser really the only thing between secure TLS connections and a MITM nightmare?
We have several (failed?) mechanisms which might prevent this, such as DANE or DNS CAA, but as it seems, none of those actually is being used by modern browsers.
Is there a way (in 2022) to prevent someone from just creating a TLS certificate and posing as another party in a way DANE or DNS CAA were supposed to do? I'm talking about actually preventing a client connecting to a server serving the wrong certificate, not just monitoring issuance like Certificate Transparency does.