I have two sets of data that I plan to send in multiple cron jobs in which the anonymization use case for Tor is otherwise defeated by traffic correlation ("timestamp-matching" to be specific, actually).

Would Tor not require tamper- and tap-proof logs (ephemeral logs of IP addresses in onion router records) to hide information exposed by timestamps that which not only the ISP but the relaying onion device cannot correlate the anonymized data?

Would the process not require a new device in which private keys are randomized, sending dummy data, and (mathematical) powers of abstraction by delay in cron jobs?

  • I'm asking if the process I propose is the exclusive solution to traffic correlation attack. I do mean ephemeral logs for "tapping" but also the Ip addresses for spoofing by the onion router to be secure by making it tamper proof by destroying it with some hardware with a private key hard-coded and randomly generated by hard-code. My process takes Tor a step further for voting (or dummy data for browsing), with command-run-on (?:CRON) jobs. "cron job abbreviation" 404 cse.google.com/ now.. so cronus job Aug 1 at 18:12
  • Why does this not have an electronic-voting tag? Aug 3 at 12:28
  • It is ok that you do not know the accepted names for things. But if you invent your own terminology, then no one knows what you are talking about. We are not mind readers. And this doesn't have a voting tag because the question is not about voting. You just have voting as a potential application for the answer you would get.
    – schroeder
    Aug 3 at 12:58
  • 1
    With your more recent edits, I think I can edit the post to ask a far more linear question. Is what I have written reflect the one factor that you wanted to ask? I know it does not cover the broad spectrum that you have been trying to ask, but this post is actually answerable.
    – schroeder
    Aug 3 at 13:05


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