French lawmakers agreed to a justice reform bill that includes a provision granting police the power to remotely activate suspects' geolocation, microphone and camera (source).

Following the senators, the deputies also gave their green light to allow certain features of smartphones and other devices to be activated remotely, thus turning them into surveillance trackers.

The deputies determined a list of professions "protected" from any capture: journalists, doctors, notaries, and bailiffs, in addition to lawyers, magistrates and members of parliament.

Technically, will it be possible for them to set up this type of surveillance on phones? If so, how will they go about it?

I wonder how authorities can effectively activate microphones and cameras from popular smartphones using iOS or Android.

I am also wondering how can the privacy of individuals not involved in any criminal activity be safeguarded when such wide-reaching surveillance measures are implemented.

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    This question and its answers are being discussed on Hacker News. Commented Jul 8, 2023 at 18:38
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    "in addition to lawyers, magistrates and members of parliament" - I'm glad they understand not wanting to be spied on.
    – Xeoncross
    Commented Jul 9, 2023 at 2:06

6 Answers 6


There is no backdoor by design in the smartphones which would provide government agencies this kind of access. With a properly signed update process (i.e. only able to install signed updates, phone not unlocked) there is also no way for a government, carrier or nearby user to push some unauthorized software update with such a backdoor to the phone, neither for baseband processor nor for the application processor.

Of course, it is technically possible to implement such backdoor or to provide governments a way to install their own. But this would either require laws to mandate such backdoors or voluntary or involuntary secret collaboration of major manufacturers with the government. Involuntary means that the manufacturer itself is compromised. In the current supply chain it is really hard to keep such backdoors secret forever though. It will be noticed by employees at the manufacturer or by security experts reverse engineering the phone or observing suspicious traffic. At least democratic governments will risk losing lots of trust if it gets known that they implement such secrets backdoors in a broad number of devices.ㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤㅤ

But, there are other more targeted ways with less broad impact, which are therefore seem to be more acceptable (not good but less evil) for the majority of citizens: Smartphones are complex software and such software has bugs. In the past there were enough critical security vulnerabilities both in the baseband firmware and the application OS (i.e. iOS, Android) which could be exploited to install some backdoor functionality. Several companies used this to provide ways for both democratic and non-democratic governments to observe citizens and track their digital activities. See for example Pegasus project for more information about such attacks.

It is likely that there will also be sufficient vulnerabilities in the future, so there is no actual need for manufacturers to cooperate with governments to explicitly add backdoors.

I am also wondering how can the privacy of individuals not involved in any criminal activity be safeguarded when such wide-reaching surveillance measures are implemented.

This is primarily a legal and not a technical issue, i.e. what rules are there in place to limit who can be observed and what data can be collected. And of course, how these rules are enforced.

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    The fact that Pegasus spyware clones have existed for years tells me that the vulnerabilities are by design.
    – Asclepius
    Commented Jul 8, 2023 at 20:30
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    @Asclepius: I think you need to distinguish between what the spyware does once installed and how the spyware gets installed. The vulnerabilities are not needed for running the spyware, it is for installing the spyware with the necessary privileges on the system. Once this is achieved the design of the OS does not hinder the spyware to function, same as it does not hinder other applications with the appropriate privileges to access microphone, GPS, network etc. Note that the exploits used to install Pegasus changed over time because vulnerabilities were fixed by the phone vendors. Commented Jul 8, 2023 at 20:40
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    @Asclepius: The design that privileged application can do more than others is intrinsic for all OS, no matter if iOS, Android, Windows, Linux, .. . This is by design and not a vulnerability. The vulnerability is to bypass security mechanism in the system in order to run with this privileged status. These can be vulnerabilities in the OS kernel, the baseband firmware or other privileged applications. Commented Jul 8, 2023 at 20:54
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    At least for geolocation, there is a front door. LTE and later phones have the ability to remotely activate GNSS geolocation in order to gather network analytics. This is called minimization of drive testing (see section 4.3) and is billed as a way to lower carbon impact and costs by reducing the tests where an operator loads a van up with multiple devices and drives around to measure network quality.
    – user71659
    Commented Jul 9, 2023 at 4:38
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    @user71659: There are also other cases were the phone is designed to provide the location, like in case of Advanced Mobile Location when calling emergency phone numbers. But this is by design for a specific purpose, not a government backdoor. There are also already mechanism like Silent SMS which to get the rough location and these are actually employed by governments together with the carriers. But it is also not a backdoor into the system. Commented Jul 9, 2023 at 4:52

Such a thing is not possible natively. Police would either need to:

  • install something on the device
  • get device makers to include this functionality

So, this could simply be an allowance to try to "hack" devices legally or social engineer suspects to install surveillance apps. Sort of a blanket "if you can figure out how, or if you have the ability to, then there is a legal fast-track for approval to do it."

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    Given the history of security vulnerabilities on both platforms, and tools like Pegasus, the first sentence of this answer is fairly misleading.
    – rkagerer
    Commented Jul 8, 2023 at 15:09
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    @rkagerer "vulnerabilities" are not "native capabilities"
    – schroeder
    Commented Jul 8, 2023 at 15:42
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    'not possible natively' ignores the existence of the baseband processor, whose entire operation is at the whim of the carrier, and is NOT controlled by the OS the main processor is running.
    – pjz
    Commented Jul 8, 2023 at 16:52
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    This answer is playing word games to grossly mislead the reader into downplaying the risk. "Natively" or not is irrelevant here. Social engineering is also pointless since success with it is hardly a guaranteed capability, and it can also take vital time to work. More guaranteed approaches with immediacy are via Pegasus clones or via the baseband or via various directly known exploits or via the service provider.
    – Asclepius
    Commented Jul 8, 2023 at 16:53
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    @Asclepius Your comment also grossly mislead the reader. The BB is not the ultimate backdoor and zero-click exploits cost millions. In fact, the BB is the hardest way to remotely take control of a phone, not only you need to deploy a SDR locally but the BB is an isolated domain and it's firmware very dependent on the phone model. @ pjz: that's not how the BB work at all. Commented Jul 8, 2023 at 17:30

Yes, it's possible.

Every single competent intelligence service on Earth has access to dozens of zero-day vulnerabilities on most popular phone brands/models. In France, this includes foreign intelligence (DGSE), internal security (DGSI), police intelligence (RG), as well as some branches of the police.

I knew someone who was (or still is) routinely paid by the government to find vulnerabilities on specific phone models.

I'm not that worried, though, because I think applying this at scale is not that practical without actual backdoors. It is unlikely that they will waste their portfolio of zero-day vulnerabilities on low-profile cases.

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    Exploits aren't immediately patched once they're exploited. An exploit may have a half-life of a year before it is patched. This means that some get used for a long while, and some for not long at all.
    – Asclepius
    Commented Jul 8, 2023 at 20:34

The government could simply demand (or ask nicely, please) that the cellular network carrier push an update to remotely activate the microphone, gps, etc. This is absolutely technically possible without physical possession of the device. The "baseband" processor is separate from the user OS, and it has low level access to the hardware. The only requirement is that the government can coerce the cellular provider into cooperating with the scheme which seems entirely within their power. In the US, cellular carriers voluntarily cooperate with government surveillance. I see no reason that it would be much different in France.

Outside of compelling the carrier to push an update, there are many many reports of 0-day vulnerabilities in cellular baseband processors, a quick internet search will turn up lots of them. Governments like to collect such vulnerabilities to be exploited rather than patched.

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    "... the cellular network carrier push an update to remotely activate ...." - From my understanding the baseband firmware is provided by the phone manufacturer and/or the vendor of the SoC (i.e. Qualcomm, Samsung, ...) and cannot simply be replaced by the cellular network carrier with a version not explicitly authorized by the vendor. It is true though that the MSP could exploit vulnerabilities in the baseband OS - there were several of such critical vulnerabilities found in the past. Commented Jul 8, 2023 at 17:17
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    I don't know of any protocol or procedure part of the 2G, 3G, LTE or 5G specifications that provides a way to update the baseband firmware over the air. Maybe you got confused with the SIM OTA updates that the carrier can do (they can send a silent SMS that updates Java applets on the SIM), but although it can also be pretty dangerous, especially in 2G where the signature is very insecure for today's standards, it is not the same security risk as OTA updates of the baseband firmware. Commented Jul 8, 2023 at 18:32
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    @AlexanderThe1st: from my understanding it is not that the carriers "have" unique versions of the OS, but the manufacturer creates such versions for the carrier, i.e. the manufacturer is still in control and not the carrier. Apart from the carrier might restrict connectivity for a phone which does not adhere to the requirements of the carrier, which kind of forces users to upgrade or loose connectivity. Commented Jul 9, 2023 at 4:37
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    This answer would benefit a lot from some sort of corroborating source that this is indeed possible. As @programings points out, this doesn't sound like a normal feature.
    – William
    Commented Jul 9, 2023 at 8:57
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    What if I buy a phone on the open market, and not from the operator, and then just put the operator's SIM in it? How much control does the operator have in this case?
    – Jonathan
    Commented Jul 9, 2023 at 10:40

It is possible, but legally (not technically): government passes a law that makes unlawful to have a smartphone and not have a certain application installed, and allows the police to ask any citizen to show that the application is installed.

Or it can require every ISP to deny internet service to anyone that does not have that application installed, and the application would have a way to connect to the ISP service, provide the IMEI or IMSI of the phone or SIM to an government application, and that would allow general internet service to that number.

It would not force installation on any phone (that's usually not possible for every brand and version of phones), but would make you install the application to be able to connect your phone to cellphone service. Without that kind of application, your phone would only work when connected to Wifi.


There are 2 major points in activating surveys on individuals. First one is technical (what application, how to install or update it, possible passive ways...). And second one is legal. It is no use for governmental organizations in democratic countries to care for the first one unless the second one is solved: any information obtained outside of a legal procedure is deemed not to exist and cannot be used in court.

This law has 2 points. First is to allow the intelligence services to make use of any security flaw present in smartphone and optionaly to use third party tools like Pegasus to gather informations. That is already an important point and had probably been requested for a long time by security services. The second one is simply communication. It is essential for governments to show their electors that they act. Whether the action is efficient is often seen as a minor concern...

For the privacy concern, it is not different from what exists in the real world. Policy has the ability to spy on any citizen, and set up telephonic conversation recordings. But it is only allowed to do so after a judge decided it was required by a legal investigation. And any information that could be obtained but that would be unrelated to the specific investigation would again be deemed not to exist and should be erased.

I am far more confident in law to protect my privacy than to any technical way: only the law could prevent various merchants to call my phone at any moment in the day. Any technical filtering would be a sure way to prevent a legitimate and important call to reach my phone if the caller's phone is out of battery and they use a friend's one...

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