Here's the situation: the government of West Nauru is known to run a lot of TOR exit nodes and to collect a lot of data on the traffic, using extra large arithmometers to collate & correlate stuff.
Does it make sense to put
ExcludeExitNodes into the
torrc file to keep the West Nauruan surveillance agencies in the dark?
- A.K.Dewdney, Scientific American, Vol.258, No.4, pp.118-121. 1988.
- Lucas Kauffman. TOR: Exploiting the weakest link. IT Security blog, April 2012.
Notes on selecting the correct answer:
- Adnan was the first to answer and also the one to post statistics in a comment. He was IMHO correct in pointing out the futility of excluding whole clusters of countries allied to the US (yet the country I alluded to may or may not have been the States, there are fewer allies for other surveillance powers which kind of invalidates his point).
- user239558 stressed that Tor is biased towards highest bandwidth nodes, and emphasized the need to tailor
torrcto the assumed threat. Was thinner on the details.
- Thomas provided a more rounded (IMHO) perspective, including extra reasons for governments to control exit nodes. That's why I chose his answer to be "correct".
The fact that these explanations were necessary convinces me that the close-voters were right and that these three answers were primarily opinion-based. I suppose that it is not reasonable to expect posters to conduct their own research and to quantify Tor's degree of vulnerability and to evaluate various mitigation strategies. It is increasingly clear that second-generation onion routing is not really up to the task of countering dedicated, well-funded surveillance efforts. Maybe when there are hundreds of thousands ad-hoc meshed (wireless) network nodes bypassing existing infrastructure truly anonymous networking becomes a real possibility.