TOR recently started to reject all the servers which have not updated their SSL. There is also initiative to block any servers that come online with unpatched SSL in the future. These cuts result in ~12% network capacity drop for Tor. That resulted from blocking ~380 servers.
Below is an excerpt from the message on Tor's mailing list:
I thought for a while about taking away their Valid flag rather
than rejecting them outright, but this way they'll get notices
in their logs.
I also thought for a while about trying to keep my list of fingerprints
up-to-date (i.e. removing the !reject line once they've upgraded their
openssl), but on the other hand, if they were still vulnerable as of
yesterday, I really don't want this identity key on the Tor network even
after they've upgraded their openssl.
If the other directory authority operators follow suit, we'll lose about
12% of the exit capacity and 12% of the guard capacity.
I/we should add to this list as we discover other relays that come
online with vulnerable openssl versions.
Also these are just the relays with Guard and/or Exit flags, so we should
add the other 1000+ at some point soon.
More info on mailing list: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-April/004336.html